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Abstract 
Although the successful pursuit of long-term goals constitutes an essential prerequisite to 
personal development, health and well-being, little research has been devoted to the 
understanding of its underlying neural processes. A critical phase in the pursuit of long-term 
goals is defined as an action crisis, conceptualized as the intra-psychic conflict between 
further goal pursuit and disengagement from the goal. In the present research, we applied an 
interdisciplinary (cognitive and neural) approach to the analysis of processes underlying the 
experience of an action crisis. In Study 1, a longitudinal field study, action crises in personal 
goals gave rise to an increased and unbiased (re)evaluation of the costs and benefits (i.e., 
rewards) of the goal. Study 2 was a magnetic resonance imaging study examining resting-
state functional connectivity. The extent of experienced action crises was associated with 
enhanced fronto-accumbal connectivity signifying increased reward-related impact on 
prefrontal action control. Action crises, furthermore, mediated the relationship between a 
dispositional measure of effective goal pursuit (action orientation) and fronto-accumbal 
connectivity. The converging and complementary results from two methodologically 
different approaches advance the understanding of the neurobiology of personal long-term 
goals, especially with respect to the role of rewards in the context of goal-related conflicts. 
Keywords: long-term goals; action crisis; action orientation; resting-state functional 
connectivity; nucleus accumbens 
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Introduction 
“Humans beings are, by nature, goal-oriented organisms” (Emmons, 1996, p. 314). 
Meaningful (i.e., non-reflexive and non-accidental) human behavior, almost without 
exception, has its origins in long-term goals (e.g., becoming a professional sportsman) that, 
by giving life structure and purpose, substantially contribute to an individual’s sense of 
fulfillment and well-being. However, despite the theoretical and practical relevance of the 
concept, “neuroscientists have yet to examine long-term goals” (Berkman & Lieberman, 
2009, p. 104). Previous neuroscientific research has focused exclusively on separate goal-
related (sub)processes or short-term goals. This is mainly attributable to the current method in 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research of analyzing goal-related cognitive 
processes task-based, i.e., in the context of experimentally induced tasks lasting seconds or 
minutes. As a consequence, interdisciplinary research that, in the realm of idiographic (i.e., 
everyday life) long-term goals, links neuroscientific to cognitive-behavioral data is lacking 
(cf. Berkman & Lieberman, 2009). 
In the present research, we therefore applied an interdisciplinary and multi-
methodological approach to the analysis of long-term goals, more precisely, the examination 
of cognitive and neural processes associated with an action crisis. An action crisis is 
conceptualized as the critical phase in the pursuit of long-term goals in which individuals, as 
a consequence of a loss of goal attainability (e.g., due to repeated setbacks) and/or 
desirability, become caught (in the decision) between further goal pursuit and disengagement 
from the goal (Brandstätter, Herrmann, & Schüler, in press; Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). 
Even though a goal has long been implemented and is being actively pursued, a goal is re-
evaluated and weighed up against potential alternatives. Thus, in an action crisis, an 
individual, in the course of goal pursuit, becomes preoccupied with an additional task 
characteristic of goal setting (i.e., the predecisional phase that precedes goal pursuit). An 
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action crisis, therefore, includes doing the splits between a volitional (goal striving) and a 
motivational (goal setting) task while the way of processing information is not ideally tuned 
to either of them (cf. cognitive tuning; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990). Whereas 
volitional processes, e.g., are facilitated by selectively analyzing and partially evaluating 
information that is relevant to the focal goal, motivational processes benefit from objectivity 
and impartiality, essential prerequisites to rational decision-making (cf. mindset theory;  
Gollwitzer, 2012). An action crisis, however, not merely results in a competition for 
resources between the cognitively conflicting tasks of striving for the focal goal (“how” 
level) and re-evaluating it ("why" level; Trope & Liberman, 2010), but between the focal 
goal and potential alternatives that become more salient in an action crisis (Shah, Friedman, 
& Kruglanski, 2002). As a consequence of being in two minds, and consistent with the idea 
that the reconsideration of alternative goals undermines goal commitment and the 
development of effective means (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002), individuals in an action crisis 
have been shown to suffer from impaired goal progress. Furthermore, as personal goals 
constitute an individual’s self-concept and self-value, action crises, especially in highly self-
relevant goals, pose a serious threat to health and well-being (Brandstätter et al., in press).   
An action crisis thus represents a critical phase in goal striving that typically precedes 
but not necessarily leads to goal disengagement. Especially with self-relevant long-term 
goals, goal disengagement does not represent a discrete event but, as “the self is partly made 
up of the person’s goals” (Carver & Scheier, 2005, p. 528), results from a lengthy and 
difficult process (Klinger, 1977). The present research, by applying the concept of an action 
crisis, attempts to delineate the cognitive (Study 1) and neural (Study 2) characteristics of 
these goal disengagement processes in everyday life. Goal disengagement, although highly 
relevant to self-regulation, has, until recently, received almost no attention (Brandtstädter, 
2007; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Wrosch et al., 2003). A process-based perspective on long-
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term goals, furthermore, has been subject merely to theoretical considerations (Klinger, 
1977).  
In Study 1, as a first step (quantitative aspect), we analyzed, in a longitudinal field 
study, the long-term consequences of an action crisis on the re-consideration of goal-related 
costs and benefits (i.e., goal-related rewards), which should be emphasized following the 
experience of an action crisis (hypothesis 1). As a second step (qualitative aspect), drawing 
on Brandstätter and Schüler (2013), we tested whether an action crisis, to some extent, 
counteracts goal shielding, which may be defined as self-regulatory processes enhancing the 
value of the focal goal (e.g., in comparisons with potential alternatives) in the course of goal 
pursuit (Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2008; Shah et al., 2002). Because an action crisis 
represents a decision-making process, which benefits from open-mindedness, it was 
hypothesized that goal (re)evaluation in an action crisis is not biased in favor of the goal. Pros 
and cons of a goal were assumed to be deliberated equally in an action crisis (hypothesis 2).  
Study 2 was an fMRI study conducted to determine neural correlates of an action 
crisis. The identification of changes in neural connectivity patterns between regions 
responsible for action control and motivation (i.e., goal-related rewards) should substantiate 
the construct of an action crisis, deepen the understanding of its underlying mechanisms and 
consequences, and contribute to the understanding of the neurobiological basis of 
motivational processes in the pursuit of long-term goals. 
To test our hypotheses, we pursued a nomothetic-idiographic approach to personal 
goals (Brunstein, 1993; Emmons, 1986). For the purpose of measurement accuracy and in 
order to capture the “nucleus” of an individual’s goal system, participants had to list their 
primary idiographic long-term goals that had to be assessed in relation to nomothetic 
variables (i.e., action crisis). Nomothetic variables were averaged across personal goals for 
statistical analyses.  
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Statistical analyses. Cross-lagged path and mediation analyses were performed using 
AMOS® (version 20), regression analyses and correlations were calculated with SPSS® 
(version 20; IBM® SPSS® Statistics Inc., Armonk, NY). Bootstrap estimates in mediation 
analyses were based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, goal (re)evaluation, which was assumed to become pronounced in an 
action crisis (hypothesis 1), was operationalized by the frequency with which participants 
deliberated on the costs and benefits of goal disengagement and further goal pursuit, 
respectively. Whereas assigned postdecisional deliberation on a goal, in the absence of an 
action crisis, has been shown to result in a “defensive focus on the pros of goal pursuit” 
(Nenkov & Gollwitzer, 2012, p. 117), i.e., goal shielding, an action crisis was hypothesized to 
lead to unbiased cost-benefit thinking (hypothesis 2). The hypothesized directionality in the 
relationship between action crisis and cost-benefit thinking was tested with cross-lagged 
panel analyses (Kenny & Harackiewicz, 1979). 
The manuscript is partly based on data previously used in a published report 
concerning goal-relevant resources (Schnelle, Brandstätter, & Knöpfel, 2010). The present 
findings have no overlap with previously reported data. 
Method 
Participants and procedures. A sample of 283 (228 women) students (Mage = 23.5 
years, SDage = 6.58 years) completed a questionnaire at time point 1 (T1) at the beginning and 
a web-based questionnaire at time point 2 (T2) at the end of the semester (14 weeks later).  
Personal goals. At T1, participants had to define four personally relevant long-term 
goals, two academic and two leisure goals.  
 Action crisis. Action crises were assessed with the Action Crisis Scale (ACRISS; 
Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013; see Supplementary material, Section A).  
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 Cost-benefit thinking Participants, at T1 and T2, indicated the frequency with which 
they had recently thought about the costs (CC) and benefits of continuing (BC) as well as the 
costs (CD) and benefits of disengaging (BD) from the goal (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). 
By averaging BC and CD, we compiled an index of the deliberation intensity of the pros of 
the goal (i.e., deliberation in favor of further goal pursuit). Analogously, CC and BD were 
used as an index of the deliberation intensity of the cons of the goal (i.e., deliberation in favor 
of goal disengagement) (see Supplementary material, Section A). 
Results  
Means (SDs) and zero-order correlations between the continuous study variables are 
reported and discussed in the Supplementary material (Section B).  
To obtain evidence regarding the directionality in the relationship between action 
crises and cost-benefit thinking, i.e., whether an action crisis precedes increased cost-benefit 
thinking, we conducted cross-lagged panel analyses (Kenny & Harackiewicz, 1979). For 
detailed information on the statistical analyses, see Supplementary material (Section C).      
Hypothesis 1 could be confirmed in the full cross-lagged path model (see 
Supplementary Figure 1) and, subsequently, the theoretically driven Model 1, which had 
excellent indices of fit (see Figure 1). (For reasons of clarity, in the following, the 
deliberation intensity of the pros of the goal, i.e., deliberation in favor of further goal pursuit, 
is abbreviated as goal pursuit whereas the deliberation intensity of the cons of a goal is 
abbreviated as goal disengagement.) Completely in line with hypothesis 1, an action crisis 
was longitudinally associated with an increase in cost-benefit thinking. 
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Figure 1. Cross-lagged path model for the prediction of cost-benefit thinking at T2 from action crisis (averaged 
over all goals) at T1 [X2(4) = 4.870, p = .301, X2/df = 1.217, NNFI = .995, CFI = .999, RMSEA = .028 (C.I. .000-
.098; PCLOSE = .609)] (Study 1). Note. GOAL PURSUIT = deliberation intensity of the pros of the goal, i.e., 
in favor of further goal pursuit; GOAL DISENGAGEMENT = deliberation intensity of the cons of the goal, i.e., 
in favor of goal disengagement. Squares indicate observed variables. A circle indicates a residual error in the 
prediction of an observed variable. Single-headed arrows represent regression paths. Double-headed arrows 
represent synchronous correlations. Above endogenous observed variables, R2 indicates the total amount of 
explained variance. Regression paths not considered in the model did not reached significance in the full cross-
lagged path model (see Supplementary Figure 1) and were excluded in the final model. Correlation coefficients 
are statistically significant at *p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < .001. For regression paths, exact probabilities are 
reported. Standardized maximum-likelihood parameters are used.       
 
To test hypothesis 2, we set the regression paths from action crises at T1 to goal 
pursuit and goal disengagement at T2 in Model 1 to equality. Hence, the resultant (more 
parsimonious) Model 2, in accordance with hypothesis 2, specified the effects of an action 
crisis on the deliberation of the pros and cons of a goal as being equally strong. Because 
Model 1 and Model 2 did not differ significantly (∆X2 1.59, df = 1, p = .207), in which case 
the more parsimonious model is to be preferred, hypothesis 2 was supported by the model 
comparison. Therefore, the conclusion may be drawn that an action crisis does not merely 
give rise to an increased (re)consideration of a goal (hypothesis 1) but that this cost-benefit 
thinking is unbiased (hypothesis 2). An action crisis, thus, gives rise to a cognitive orientation 
that, to some extent, counteracts goal shielding.     
  
E2
E3
.55***
.50***
.73***
.38***
R2 = .32
R2 = .53
E1
.58***
R2 = .39
.33***
.19**
.13*
.14*
GOAL PURSUIT
TIME 1
ACTION CRISIS
TIME 1
ACTION CRISIS
TIME 2
GOAL PURSUIT
TIME 2
GOAL
DISENGAGEMENT
TIME 1
GOAL
DISENGAGEMENT
TIME 2
.26 (p < .001)
.11 (p = .027)
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Study 2 
In continuation of Study 1, in which characteristics of an action crisis were explored 
on a cognitive level, Study 2 aimed at uncovering the neural activity pattern underlying 
changes in information processing (i.e., unbiased cost-benefit thinking) in an action crisis. 
Thereby, Study 2 represents a new approach to the analysis of the neurobiology of personal 
long-term goals (Berkman & Lieberman, 2009).  
From a theoretical point of view, the conflict being characteristic of an action crisis 
(i.e., doing the splits between a motivational and a volitional task) may be adequately 
accounted for by the investigation of brain regions subserving action control (i.e., volition) 
and motivation (i.e., goal-related rewards). Whereas the prefrontal cortex instantiates a neural 
system for cognitive control and planning (i.e., volitional abilities relevant to the pursuit of 
long-term goals; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Tanji, Shima, & Mushiake, 2007), the nucleus 
accumbens (NAcc), part of the ventral striatum, is central to the brain’s reward system and 
provides a link between motivationally relevant emotional processes (e.g., reward 
anticipation or subjective preferences) and action (Mogenson, Jones, & Yim, 1980). 
Importantly, the NAcc receives regulatory influences from the prefrontal cortex (Sesack & 
Grace, 2010).  
In an action crisis, as a consequence of reduced (i.e., counterbalanced) goal shielding, 
(cf. Study 1), a goal should lose its predominance over competing alternatives, whereby an 
individual’s behavior becomes more susceptible to incentives associated with alternative 
goals (Shah et al., 2002) as well as goal-irrelevant temptations (Förster & Denzler, 2009; 
Kruglanski et al., 2002). Therefore, from a neural perspective, an action crisis should re-
instigate or interfere with prefrontal cortical self-control mechanisms crucial to future-
oriented behavior, more precisely, the pursuit of long-term goals (Miller & Cohen, 2001; 
Tanji et al., 2007). Subcortical reward-related (short-term and long-term) impact on behavior, 
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consequently, should be increased. The pursuit of “long-term task goal[s]” (p. 1488) in the 
context of increased reward-related impact on action control has been examined in an fMRI 
study by Diekhof and Gruber (2010). Even though, in the respective study, the focus was on 
an experimentally induced and thus nomothetic goal, the results may be applicable to long-
term goals and are therefore of importance to the present research.  
Subjects were confronted with a “desire-reason dilemma” (Diekhof & Gruber, 2010, 
p. 1489) in which actions favoring the successful performance of a task goal (“reason”) had 
to be preferred over immediately available rewards (“desire”). This specific experimental 
context was characterized by increased negative functional connectivity between left 
anteroventral prefrontal/lateral frontopolar cortex (FPC) and bilateral NAcc. In addition, 
interindividually, behavioral success in favoring the task outcome despite the presence of 
reward-related distractors (i.e., effective goal pursuit) was predicted by the extent of FPC-
NAcc negative functional connectivity.  
Because, in an action crisis, the influence of goal-related (cf. Study 1) as well as goal-
independent incentives and temptations (Shah et al., 2002) on action control is assumed to be 
increased, the neurobiological findings reported by Diekhof and Gruber (2010) provide an 
excellent framework for the investigation of the neural basis of experiencing action crises in 
idiographic long-term goals. As, there, good task performance (i.e., high effectiveness of goal 
pursuit) was characterized by decreased fronto-accumbal connectivity, the opposite pattern 
was hypothesized to underlie the experience of an action crisis that has been shown to impair 
goal progress (low effectiveness of goal pursuit) (Brandstätter et al., in press). Thus, we 
expected increased positive or decreased negative functional connectivity between left FPC 
and NAcc to be associated with an action crisis (hypothesis 3). 
Investigating goal-related processing in an action crisis in a brain imaging study is 
associated with considerable conceptual and methodological demands. First, an individual’s 
BEING IN TWO MINDS  11 
long-term goals exert pervasive influence on cognition and behavior, even outside awareness 
(e.g., Bargh et al., 2001), and an action crisis in a highly self-relevant goal (e.g., “Should I 
drop out of university?”) typically lasts several months (cf. Study 1). An action crisis, 
therefore, is likely to become manifest in intrinsic brain properties, especially in light of 
research on procedural priming (cf. Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2009) which suggest that 
cognitive procedures, once activated, influence the way of information processing in 
subsequent tasks. Procedural priming effects have been shown to last several days (Smith, 
Stewart, & Buttram, 1992) and, importantly, to result from the experience of action crises 
(Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2013b). Second, an action crisis, by definition, represents a real-
life phenomenon with high interindividual variance regarding the content of idiographic long-
term goals. As a result, implementation in task-based fMRI appears inadequate (cf. Berkman 
& Lieberman, 2009).  
As a consequence, an action crisis was mapped on the neural level in a task-free 
setting. “Resting-state” functional connectivity (rsFC) is defined as the degree of coupling 
between brain regions in the absence of any task, as reflected by the interregional coherence 
of the spontaneously changing signal measured during fMRI (Fox & Raichle, 2007). rsFC is 
considered to index intrinsic neuronal processes (“intrinsic connectivity”) (Fox & Raichle, 
2007), for example memory consolidation (Albert, Robertson, Mehta, & Miall, 2009; Wang, 
Liu, Li, & Zang, 2012). A growing literature adds to the fact that interindividual variability in 
rsFC accounts for aspects of personality and behavior (Kelly, Biswal, Craddock, Castellanos, 
& Milham, 2012). In the present research, rsFC was related to the extent to which individuals 
were currently experiencing action crises in personal goals.  
As Diekhof and Gruber (2010) reported FPC-NAcc functional coupling to be 
positively associated with trait impulsivity, we expected trait-related, goal-relevant self-
regulatory abilities (i.e., state versus action orientation; Kuhl, 1994b) to be negatively related 
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to fronto-accumbal coupling. Importantly, action orientation, the volitional ability to regulate 
basic affect (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2007), has been linked to prefrontal executive 
functions (Koole, 2004; Kuhl & Koole, 2004) and could be consistently identified as a 
predictor of effective goal pursuit (e.g., Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005; Brunstein, 1989, 
2001; Kuhl, 1981, 1992, 1994b) and protective factor for the experience of action crises in 
personal goals (Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2013a). Therefore, we hypothesized action crises 
in personal goals to mediate the relationship between action orientation and fronto-accumbal 
decoupling. Action-oriented individuals, due to a reduced extent of experienced action crises, 
were assumed to show increased fronto-accumbal decoupling (hypothesis 4).  
To complement our approach, we also analyzed fronto-accumbal structural 
connectivity. We found evidence that white matter integrity between left NAcc and left FPC 
is modulated by action orientation (see Supplementary material, Section H). 
The manuscript is partly based on data previously used in a published report 
concerning relations between anxiety and connectivity in limbic pathways (Baur, Hänggi, 
Langer, & Jäncke, 2013).  
Method  
Participants and procedures. For magnetic fMRI, we analyzed data of 33 healthy 
participants (18 women, Mage = 24.9 years, SDage = 4.57 years). None of the subjects was part 
of the dataset of Study 1. Questionnaires were sent to participants one week prior to the fMRI 
examination. For detailed information about the sample, exclusion criteria, ethics, 
psychometrics (e.g., control variables), and fMRI scanning, see Supplementary material 
(Sections D and E). 
Personal goals. As in Study 1, participants were asked to state (three) personally 
relevant long-term goals from different areas of life they were currently striving for. 
Action crisis. See Study 1. 
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Action orientation. Action orientation was assessed using the Action Control Scale 
(ACS-90; Kuhl, 1994a). 
Regions of interest definition. Based on previous evidence (Diekhof & Gruber, 
2010) and our theorizing on action crises, we focused on the left and right NAcc as well as 
the left FPC in an a priori regions-of-interest (ROI) approach (see Figure 2A). Connectivity 
was assessed between left NAcc and left FPC as well as between right NAcc and left FPC. 
For details regarding the definition of ROIs, see Supplementary material (Section E). 
 
Figure 2. (A) Regions of interest, coronal (left) and sagittal (right) coordinates reported in Montreal 
Neurological Institute standard space. (B) Hemodynamic signal time course across 260 brain scans 
(corresponding to 10 min of resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging) for left nucleus accumbens 
(red) and left lateral frontopolar cortex (green), respectively, exemplarily shown for one subject. The z-value 
represents the correlation between the two time courses.  
 
Resting-state functional connectivity. Preprocessing was carried out with DPARSF 
toolbox (Chao-Gan & Yu-Feng, 2010) using functions of SPM 8 
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8) and is described in detail in Supplementary 
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material (Section E). Preprocessed fMRI data were subjected to REST toolbox 1.6 (Song et 
al., 2011) extracting the mean blood oxygenation level dependent signal time course for each 
ROI and for each subject. Next, signal time courses (exemplarily shown in Figure 2B) were 
cross-correlated between left respectively right NAcc and left FPC. Finally, correlations were 
r-to-z-transformed to improve normal distribution for group-level statistics. To complement 
ROI-based analyses, we also set an exploratory whole-brain approach. This comprised a 
seed-based analysis of rsFC of left and right NAcc, respectively (see Supplementary material, 
Section G). Using NAcc as seed is of interest and should yield valid results, as pointed out by 
a recent combined meta-analytic and rsFC study (Cauda et al., 2011).  
Statistical analyses. FPC-NAcc rsFC, as represented by the z-value derived from the 
ROI analysis, was linked to the extent participants were experiencing action crises in personal 
goals using multiple regression analyses.  
Results  
Means (SDs) and zero-order correlations between the major study variables are 
reported in Supplementary material, Supplementary Table 2 (Section F). 
Action crisis and functional connectivity. Completely in line with hypothesis 3, 
rsFC between frontal and accumbal ROIs, even after having controlled for action orientation 
and neuroticism, could be predicted by the extent to which participants were experiencing 
action crises in personal goals (for left NAcc-left FPC connectivity: β = .43, p = .025; for 
right NAcc-left FPC connectivity: β = .44, p = .018; see Table 1).  
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Table 1 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Left NAcc-Left FPC Connectivity and Right NAcc-left 
FPC Connectivity From Action Crises Regarding Personal Goals (Study 2) 
 
The exploratory whole-brain approach confirmed the association of FPC-NAcc rsFC 
with action crises. Additional regions outside of our primary hypothesis are shown and 
discussed in the Supplementary material (Section G).   
Action orientation, action crisis, and functional connectivity. In order to test 
hypothesis 4, i.e., whether action crises in personal goals mediated the relationship between 
action orientation and fronto-accumbal decoupling (see Supplementary material, 
Supplementary Table 2, Section F), we performed two mediation analyses (Baron & Kenny, 
1986), for left NAcc-left FPC connectivity (see Figure 3) and for right NAcc-left FPC 
connectivity (see Figure 4).  
 
 
 
∆R 2 β ∆R 2 β
.12 .14
Control variablesa
.14* .15*
Action crisis  .43*  .44*
.27* .29*
n 33 33
Right NAcc-left FPC connectivity
*p  < .05. 
Step 2
Total R 2
Left NAcc-left FPC connectivity
Step 1
Predictor
aControl variables included action orientation and neuroticism.
Note.  NAcc = nucleus accumbens; FPC = anteroventral prefrontal/lateral frontopolar cortex. For 
action crisis, values are averaged over the three personal goals. 
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Figure 3. A mediation model of action orientation, action crisis (averaged over all goals), and left NAcc-left 
FPC connectivity. Action crisis was a significant mediating factor between action orientation and left NAcc-left 
FPC connectivity. Note. NAcc = nucleus accumbens; FPC = frontopolar cortex. R2 indicates the total explained 
variance (i.e., the total effect on left NAcc-left FPC connectivity). Dotted regression paths are not significant. 
Bold regression paths are statistically significant (*p < .05, **p < .01). 
 
 
Figure 4. A mediation model of action orientation, action crisis (averaged over all goals), and right NAcc-left 
FPC connectivity. Action crisis was a significant mediating factor between action orientation and right NAcc-
left FPC connectivity. Note. NAcc = nucleus accumbens; FPC = frontopolar cortex. R2 indicates the total 
explained variance (i.e., the total effect on right NAcc-left FPC connectivity). Dotted regression paths are not 
significant. Bold regression paths are statistically significant (*p < .05, **p < .01). 
 
By explaining 55 (left NAcc-left FPC connectivity) or rather 72 percent (right NAcc-
left FPC connectivity), respectively, of the relationship between action orientation and fronto-
accumbal decoupling, action crises in personal goals significantly mediated the relationship 
between predictor and outcome variable (for statistical details, see Tables 2 and 3).    
 
 
 
ACTION CRISIS
TIME 1
ACTION 
ORIENTATION
TIME 1
LEFT NACC-LEFT 
FPC CONNECTIVITY
TIME 2
E1
E2
.42* 
R2 = .21
R2 = .26
-.46** 
-.16
(-.35*)
a PATH b PATH
c‘ PATH
c PATH
ACTION CRISIS
TIME 1
ACTION 
ORIENTATION
TIME 1
RIGHT NACC-LEFT 
FPC CONNECTIVITY
TIME 2
E1
E2
.41* 
R2 = .21
R2 = .20
-.46** 
-.07
(-.26)
a PATH b PATH
c‘ PATH
c PATH
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Table 2 
Mediation Analysis of Action Crisis Partly Accounting for the Association Between Action Orientation and Left 
NAcc-Left FPC connectivity (Study 2) 
 
Table 3 
Mediation Analysis of Action Crisis Partly Accounting for the Association Between Action Orientation and 
Right NAcc-Left FPC connectivity (Study 2) 
 
General Discussion 
The concept of an action crisis is defined as the intra-psychic conflict between further 
goal pursuit and disengagement from the goal and represents a methodologically new 
approach that provides critical insight into goal disengagement processes. Even though not 
every action crisis leads into goal disengagement, the ACRISS (Brandstätter & Schüler, 
2013) allows for analyzing situational and dispositional circumstances under which the focal 
goal, in the course of goal pursuit, becomes questioned and, ultimately, relinquished. In the 
present research, we applied the ACRISS to study the cognitive (Study 1) and neural (Study 
2) basis of questioning a goal (i.e., experiencing an action crisis) in the midst of goal pursuit.  
In line with our theorizing, in Study 1, an action crisis gave rise to an increased and 
unbiased re-evaluation of goal-related costs and benefits (i.e., rewards) and thereby reduced 
goal shielding (Shah et al., 2002). Whereas an unbiased goal re-evaluation, i.e., an objective 
Effect SE
c  path (total effect) -.35 -2.13 = .034
a  path -.46 -2.90 = .004
b path  .42  2.47 = .014
a  x b  (indirect effect) -.19  .10 (-.450, -.033) = .016
c ' path (direct effect) -.16 -.94 = .347
Note.  CI = confidence interval. C.R. = critical ratio. Maximum likelihood estimates are 
provided for the c path, a path, b path, and c' path. For the standardized indirect 
effect (a x b), bootstrap estimates w ith confidence intervals are provided.  
Standardized Estimate pC.R. 95% CI
Effect SE
c  path (total effect) -.26 -1.51 = .132
a  path -.46 -2.90 = .004
b path  .41  2.31 = .021
a  x b  (indirect effect) -.19  .11 (-.452, -.025) = .022
c ' path (direct effect) -.07 -.40 = .691
Note.  CI = confidence interval. C.R. = critical ratio. Maximum likelihood estimates are 
provided for the c path, a path, b path, and c' path. For the standardized indirect 
effect (a x b), bootstrap estimates w ith confidence intervals are provided.  
Standardized Estimate pC.R. 95% CI
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and impartial perspective, may support an adequate resolution of the conflict, it is likely to 
interfere with the pursuit of the goal. 
In Study 2, we aimed at identifying a neural activity pattern that forms the basis of 
increased goal-related cost-benefit thinking in action crises (cf. Study 1). As, in an action 
crisis, impairments in behavioral goal pursuit are most likely attributable to increased reward-
related impact on prefrontal action control (cf. goal shielding, Study 1; see also Brandstätter 
& Schüler, 2013), we assessed connectivity between NAcc and FPC in individuals varying in 
the extent of experienced action crises in personal long-term goals. In line with our 
hypotheses, we found that FPC-NAcc rsFC was positively correlated with the degree of 
experienced action crises. Conversely, FPC-NAcc rsFC was negatively associated with action 
orientation. Furthermore, action crises mediated the relationship between action orientation 
and FPC-NAcc rsFC.  
The results of Study 2 are consistent with research demonstrating the importance of 
FPC-NAcc connectivity for (task) goal-related “desire-reason dilemma[s]” (Diekhof & 
Gruber, 2010, p. 1489) and its association with trait impulsivity (Diekhof & Gruber, 2010; 
Diekhof et al., 2012). Importantly, the left FPC, along with its functional connectivity to the 
NAcc, has been shown to play a key role in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, which is 
characterized by deficient action control (i.e., impulsive behavior) (Dias et al., 2013). 
Whereas the NAcc is well-known for representing an interface between motivation and 
action, the functions of the FPC (as opposed to other prefrontal areas) have become subject to 
empirical research in recent time. Lesion studies, for example, point to a role of FPC in 
decision-making (Gläscher et al., 2012; Kovach et al., 2012). In an action crisis, an individual 
is captured in the decision between further goal pursuit and disengagement from the goal 
(Brandstätter et al., in press). Furthermore, perfectly in line with the concept of an action 
crisis and the present results, FPC activity is implicated in the process of exploring alternative 
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goals while keeping the main goal in mind (Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 
2006; Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, & Grafman, 1999), weighing the advantages of not 
chosen alternatives (Boorman, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2011), and behavioral switching 
(Boorman, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2011; Boorman, Behrens, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2009).   
The relationship between FPC-NAcc functional connectivity and action crises may be 
interpreted in two ways. First, increased direct “proactive” correspondence between FPC and 
NAcc in action crises may underlie the observed results. The synchronization of cortical and 
subcortical subsystems might involve active recruitment (top-down) of (additional) goal-
related motivational resources instantiated in the NAcc or, vice versa, the relay of 
motivational inputs to the FPC (bottom-up) for updating implemented task-sets (Sakai & 
Passingham, 2006). This interpretation is in accordance with Koechlin and Hyafil (2007, p. 
594) who construed the FPC as a system for “protecting the execution of long-term mental 
plans [...] and for generating new, possibly more rewarding, behavioral or cognitive 
sequences”. These scenarios would be perfectly in line with the concept of an action crisis as 
an adaptive phase in goal striving (Brandstätter et al., in press).  
Second, our results could be interpreted in the background of studies indicating that a 
decrease of reward-related activation in the NAcc is associated with a relative increase of 
FPC activation, i.e., negative functional connectivity between these areas. Specifically, this 
has been shown in an experimental setting in which the pursuit of a long-term task goal 
required participants to abstain from immediate rewards (Diekhof & Gruber, 2010; Diekhof 
et al., 2012) and under pharmacological treatment with antidepressive drugs (Abler, Grön, 
Hartmann, Metzger, & Walter, 2012). Accordingly, subjects in action crises may exhibit 
reduced top-down inhibition of the NAcc. An impaired desegregation of neural subsystems 
centered in the left FPC and NAcc, furthermore, could provide an explanation of the negative 
consequences of action crises on goal pursuit (Brandstätter et al., in press). In support of this 
BEING IN TWO MINDS  20 
line of thought, behavioral stability, on the neural level, has been shown to be reflected by the 
magnitude of the segregation of resting-state networks (Kelly, Uddin, Biswal, Castellanos, & 
Milham, 2008). 
It seems most probable that functional connectivity in the brain is attributable to a 
combination of more transient (“state”) and more long-lasting (“trait”) aspects. In fact, 
neuroscientific research indicates that rsFC may be ascribed to both, dynamic states (Schultz, 
Balderston, & Helmstetter, 2012) as well as more stable personality traits (Adelstein et al., 
2011). Correspondingly, in Study 2, FPC-NAcc rsFC was associated with action orientation 
(trait) and action crises (state) (cf. Supplementary material, Supplementary Table 2). 
However, as the relationship between action crises and FPC-NAcc rsFC was not merely more 
profound than between action orientation and FPC-NAcc rsFC but remained when 
controlling for action orientation and, furthermore, action crises mediated the relationship 
between action orientation and FPC-NAcc rsFC, the conclusion seems warranted that the 
(more proximal and constitutive) effect of action crises on fronto-accumbal dynamics exists 
independent of the (more distal) influence of trait action orientation.  
Resting-state fMRI results of Study 2 underscore the significance of connectivity 
between FPC and NAcc for (long-term) goal-related processing, especially in the face of 
increased impact of goal-relevant rewards on action control (i.e., in an action crisis). Study 2, 
thereby, extends and complements previous approaches that applied task-based fMRI to 
examine similar goal-related neural processes in the context of long-term task goals (Diekhof 
& Gruber, 2010; Diekhof et al., 2012).  
Resting-state fMRI enables to map how an individual’s subjective constitution is 
linked to intrinsic neural processes (Kelly et al., 2012). Following this idea, and in order to 
reduce “acute” and unspecific effects (e.g., biases through action crisis-related affect and 
stress), participants, while in the scanner, were neither prompted to actively think about their 
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long-term goals nor instructed to perform a goal-related task. Correspondingly, goal-related 
questionnaires were completed by participants at home and results remained significant when 
controlling for state anxiety (analyses not shown). The examination of subjects that vary in 
the extent of experienced action crises in a task-independent quasi-experimental setting 
allowed for connecting constitutive aspects of the pursuit of long-term goals with resting-
state connectivity. A task-based (i.e., experimental) approach, on the contrary, would have 
required to dissociate goal-related long-term from task-specific effects (cf. Berkman & 
Lieberman, 2009). Therefore, our results have specific implications for the neurobiological 
dynamics underlying the pursuit of long-term goals. 
Limitations and future directions 
Our results do not allow any inferences about the directional nature (top-down vs. 
bottom-up) of fronto-accumbal dynamics and the nature of electrophysiological processes 
(inhibitory vs. excitatory) at neuronal transition zones in the presence of an action crisis. 
Thus, either of the discussed interpretations (cf. above), or a combination of both, may be 
true. Due to the focus on ROI-based analyses in the FPC and NAcc, we refrain from 
statements about larger goal-related functional networks across the whole brain. Given these 
limitations, future studies may use further methods paralleling fMRI and, for example, 
explicitly address the issue of neuronal inhibition/excitation of NAcc by the FPC, analyze 
effective connectivity to estimate causal relationships within prefronto-striatal routes, and 
examine additional regions interacting with FPC and NAcc in action crises. Third-party 
regions such as medial prefrontal cortex might have mediated the observed fronto-accumbal 
functional interactions. Follow-up analyses may evaluate whether fronto-accumbal 
connectivity, possibly in interaction with action orientation, predicts the outcome and/or the 
overcoming of an action crisis. 
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Concluding remarks 
We draw attention to altered FPC-NAcc rsFC as a constitutive characteristic and/or 
adaptive mechanism in response to the experience of an action crisis. To the best of our 
knowledge, the present research is one of the very first to link motivationally relevant 
cognitive processes (Study 1) to NAcc-related functional connectivity in the resting state 
(Study 2). It also represents a new approach to the analysis of the neural underpinnings of the 
pursuit of long-term goals. The practical relevance of the analysis of neural mechanisms that 
form the basis of the experience of an action crises appears evident when considering the 
enormous significance of personal goals for affect, cognition, and behavior (Moskowitz & 
Grant, 2009).   
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Supplementary Methods Study 1 
SECTION A 
Participants and procedure. At T1, a sample of 333 (263 women) psychology 
students of a first-semester course at the University of Zurich filled out a questionnaire. A 
15% attrition rate at time 2 (T2), at the end of the semester (14 weeks later), resulted in a total 
of 283 students. As the two subgroups did not differ with respect to any study variables, 
analyses were performed with students who participated in the study at both measurement 
points. 
Action crisis. The extent to which participants were experiencing action crises in the 
four defined personal goals was assessed with the Action Crisis Scale (ACRISS; Brandstätter 
& Schüler, 2013). The ACRISS consists of six items measuring different aspects of goal 
striving being constitutive of a postdecisional goal conflict (i.e., conflict [“I doubt whether I 
should continue striving for my goal or disengage from it.”], setbacks [“Striving for this goal 
goes without any problems.”, reversely coded], implemental disorientation [“When striving 
for this goal I repeatedly am confronted with situations where I do not know how to 
continue.”], rumination [“I repeatedly ruminate about my goal.”], disengagement impulses [“I 
have thought of disengaging from my goal.”], and procrastination [“I repeatedly haven’t done 
anything for my goal despite the intention to do so.”]. Each statement was rated on a scale 
ranging from 1 (no agreement) to 5 (very much agreement). At both time points, the 
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reliability of the ACRISS, which was assessed for all personal goals separately, was high (α ≥ 
.73 at T1; α ≥ .73 at T2). 
Cost-benefit thinking. Regarding their four personal goals separately (at T1 and T2), 
participants were advised to indicate the frequency, on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 
(very frequently), with which they had recently thought about the costs (CC) and benefits of 
continuing (BC) the goal as well as the costs (CD) and benefits of disengaging (BD) from the 
goal, respectively (cf. Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013, Studies 1 and 4). By averaging the 
benefits of continuing the goal (BC) and the costs of disengaging from the goal (CD), we 
compiled an index of the deliberation intensity of the pros of the goal (i.e., deliberation in 
favor of further goal pursuit) (r ≥ .33 and r ≤ .69 at T1, all p’s < .001; r ≥ .41 and r ≤ .67 at 
T2, all p’s < .001). Analogously, the costs of continuing the goal (CC) and the benefits of 
disengaging from the goal (BD) were used as an index of the deliberation intensity of the 
cons of the goal (i.e., deliberation in favor of goal disengagement) (r ≥ .18 and r ≤ .39 at T1, 
all p’s < .002; r ≥ .42 and r ≤ .57 at T2, all p’s < .001). 
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Supplementary Results Study 1 
SECTION B 
Supplementary Table 1  
Means (SDs) and Zero-Order Correlations Among the Major Study Variables  
 
As can be seen from Supplementary Table 1, in the total sample, on average, the pros 
of a goal (T1: M = 3.42, SE = 0.04; T2: M = 3.25, SE = 0.51) were more frequently 
deliberated than the cons of a goal (T1: M = 1.94, SE = 0.04; T2: M = 1.75, SE = 0.04) at T1 
(t(282) = 30.27, p < .001, r = .87) as well as at T2 (t(282) = 26.98, p < .001, r = .85). This 
was to be expected because the pursuit of a goal is generally associated with the volitional 
mindset that prevents an individual from processing information implying goal 
disengagement (Gollwitzer, 2012). In the present research (hypothesis 2), we analyzed if this 
volitional bias in cost-benefit thinking is reduced by an action crisis. Cross-sectionally, 
hypothesis 2 is supported by our data as an action crisis, at T1 and T2, was found to be more 
strongly associated with the deliberation of the cons of a goal (see Supplementary Table 1). 
 
SECTION C 
Cross-lagged panel analyses. Whereas, in cross-lagged path models (cf. Figure 1), 
autoregressive effects (e.g., regression path from action crises T1 to action crises T2) are 
Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5
1.   Action crisis (T1) 2.29 (0.51) −
2.   Action crisis (T2) 2.28 (0.54)  .73*** −
3.   Deliberation goal pursuit (T1) 3.42 (0.68)  .33***   .30*** −
4.   Deliberation goal pursuit (T2) 3.25 (0.87)  .30***   .32***  .62*** −
5.   Deliberation goal disengagement (T1) 1.94 (0.61)  .55***  .43***  .19***  .12* −
6.   Deliberation goal disengagement (T2) 1.75 (0.61)  .46***  .63***  .20***  .23***  .53***
Note. T in T1-T2 = time. For action crisis, deliberation goal pursuit, and deliberation goal 
disengagement, values are averaged over all four personal goals. Deliberation goal pursuit = 
deliberation of the pros of the goal; deliberation goal disengagement = deliberation of the cons of the 
goal.
*p  < .05. ***p  < .001. 
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indicative of the temporal stability of a variable and act as statistical controls, cross-lagged 
effects (e.g., regression path from action crises at T1 to goal disengagement at T2) specify the 
causal relationship between two variables. Therefore, these cross-lagged effects, by allowing 
for testing our hypotheses, were of theoretical interest in our study (Oud & Delsing, 2010). 
As values were averaged across possibly completely different goals for action crises 
and cost-benefit thinking and therefore no homogeneity (i.e., internal consistency) can be 
assumed, the analyses included no measurement models.   
Cross-lagged path analyses were performed using the IBM® SPSS® Amos software 
(version 20; IBM® SPSS® Statistics Inc., Armonk, NY) based on the variance-covariance 
matrix. Model fit was estimated by the maximum-likelihood method.  
Statistical procedure: Firstly, we examined the full cross-lagged path model (see 
Supplementary Figure 1). (For reasons of clarity, in the following, the deliberation intensity 
of the pros of the goal, i.e. deliberation in favor or further goal pursuit, is abbreviated as goal 
pursuit whereas the deliberation intensity of the cons of a goal is abbreviated as goal 
disengagement.) The full model, completely in line with hypothesis 1, showed statistically 
significant cross-lagged effects of action crises at T1 on goal pursuit (β = .14, t = 2.49, p = 
.013) and goal disengagement (β = .23, t = 3.86, p < .001) at T2. Conversely, goal 
disengagement (β = .04, t = 0.86, p = .393) and goal pursuit (β = .06, t = 1.49, p = .137) at T1 
neither significantly affected action crises at T2 nor goal disengagement (β = .04, t = 0.82, p 
= .414) or goal pursuit (β = -.07, t = -1.25, p = .210) at T2, respectively (cross-lagged effects).  
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Supplementary Figure 1. Full cross-lagged path model for the prediction of cost-benefit thinking at T2 from 
action crisis (averaged over all goals) at T1 and the prediction of action crisis at T2 from cost-benefit thinking at 
T1. Note: GOAL PURSUIT = deliberation intensity of the pros of the goal, i.e. in favor of further goal pursuit; 
GOAL DISENGAGEMENT = deliberation intensity of the cons of the goal, i.e. in favor of goal disengagement. 
Squares indicate observed variables. A circle indicates a residual error in the prediction of an observed variable. 
Single-headed arrows represent regression paths. Double-headed arrows represent synchronous correlations. 
Above endogenous observed variables, R2 indicates the total amount of explained variance. Broken regression 
paths did not reached significance in the full cross-lagged path model and were excluded in the final model. 
Correlation coefficients are statistically significant at *p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < .001. For regression paths, 
exact probabilities are reported. Standardized maximum-likelihood parameters are used.      
 
Secondly, having confirmed hypothesis 1 in the full cross-lagged path model (that has 
zero degrees of freedom and, therefore, does not allow for the estimation of fit indices), we 
removed the non-significant regression paths from the saturated model to test the model fit of 
the more parsimonious and theoretically derived model (Model 1). The resultant Model 1 (see 
Supplementary Figure 2), which assumed a causal effect of action crises at T1 on cost-benefit 
thinking at T2, had excellent indices of fit [X2(4) = 4.870, p = .301, X2/df = 1.217, NNFI = 
.995, CFI = .999, RMSEA = .028 (C.I. .000-.098; PCLOSE = .609)] and could be accepted 
(Byrne, 2010). Action crises at T1 significantly predicted goal pursuit (β = .26, t = 4.60, p < 
.001) and goal disengagement (β = .11, t = 2.21, p = .027) at T2. Hypothesis 1 could therefore 
be confirmed. An action crisis causally preceded cost-benefit thinking. 
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Supplementary Figure 2. Cross-lagged path model for the prediction of cost-benefit thinking at T2 from action 
crisis (averaged over all goals) at T1. Note: For adequate interpretation of the cross-lagged path models, see 
Figure 1. 
 
Thirdly, in order to test hypothesis 2, we set the regression paths from action crises at 
T1 to goal pursuit and goal disengagement at T2 in Model 1 to equality. Hence, the resultant 
more parsimonious Model 2, in accordance with hypothesis 2, specified the effects of an 
action crisis on the deliberation of the pros and cons of a goal as being equally strong. Model 
2 had excellent indices of fit [X2(5) = 6.460, p = .264, X2/df = 1.292, NNFI = .994, CFI = 
.998, RMSEA = .032 (C.I. .000-.093; PCLOSE = .606)] (Byrne, 2010) . As in Model 1, 
action crises at T1 significantly predicted cost-benefit thinking at T2 (unstandardized values: 
β = .26, SE = .06, t = 4.73, p < .001; standardized values for goal pursuit, β = .22, p < .001, 
and goal disengagement, β = .15, p < .001). By statistically comparing Model 2 against 
Model 1, we obtained evidence that indicates whether the pros and cons of a goal, in 
consequence of an action crisis, are deliberated objectively. We compared the two nested 
models by computing the X2 probability of their deviances (1.59, df = 1) using the pchisq 
function of the freely-available statistical software R (http://cran.r-project.org). Because the 
two models did not differ significantly (p = .207), in which case the more parsimonious 
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Model 2 is to be preferred, hypothesis 2 was supported by the model comparison. Therefore, 
the conclusion may be drawn that an action crisis does not merely give rise to an increased 
(re)consideration of a goal (hypothesis 1) but that this cost-benefit thinking is not biased in 
favor of the focal goal (hypothesis 2). An action crisis, thus, gives rise to a mindset shift that 
neutralizes the shielding effect of the volitional mindset.     
 
Supplementary Methods Study 2 
SECTION D 
Participants and procedures. For magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), we enrolled 
35 healthy participants via announcements at bulletin boards on the campus of the University 
of Zurich and the Federal Institute of Technology Zurich ETH, Switzerland. Exclusion 
criteria for MRI were general contraindications, substance or drug use, excessive 
consummation of alcohol and nicotine, a history of medication affecting the central nervous 
system, a history of neurologic or psychiatric disorders, pregnancy, and age over 40 years. 
According to self-report and the Annett questionnaire (Annett, 1970), only one subject was 
left-handed. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. Subjects were 
financially compensated for their participation. The study was approved by the local ethics 
committee and conforms to the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2000). 
Of the original 35 participants, two were excluded from further analyses. One participant 
reported a history of antidepressant medication and one participant scored exceptionally high 
in the lie subscale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (lie score: 8, theoretical 
maximum: 9; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964) and, additionally, did not score at all in the ACRISS 
(Brandstätter, Herrmann, & Schüler, in press), i.e., obtained a score of one that was more than 
three standard deviations (SDACRISS = .49) below the mean (MACRISS = 2.53). The final sample 
consisted of 33 subjects (18 women, Mage = 24.9 years, SDage = 4.57 years, age range: 20-37 
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years). The majority of participants were undergraduate students (79 percent; 9 men, 17 
women), others were graduate students (9 percent; 2 men, 1 woman) or employees (12 
percent; 4 men, 0 women).  
Action crisis. The reliability of the ACRISS (Brandstätter et al., in press; Brandstätter 
& Schüler, 2013), for all three goals, was high (.71 ≤ α ≤ .89). 
Action orientation. Action orientation was assessed using the Action Control Scale 
(ACS-90; Kuhl, 1994) that consists of 24 items (e.g., “When I must finish something soon: 
(a) I find it easy to get it done. (b) I have to push myself to get started.”). Internal consistency 
was satisfactory (α = .72). In the present research, the two subscales of the ACS (decision-
related [AOD] and failure-related [AOF] action orientation) were of no particular interest. It 
was hypothesized that the ability to self-generate positive affect (i.e., self-motivation, AOD) 
and the ability to reduce negative affect (i.e., self-relaxation, AOF) hold – depending on the 
personality (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2007), the goal, and situational conditions – the 
same potential for the prevention and the resolution of action crises in personal goals.  
Control variables. In the present research, neuroticism (i.e., an individual’s 
sensitivity to negative affect; Baumann et al., 2007) served as a control variable to provide 
neural evidence of the functional difference between affect regulation (i.e., action orientation) 
and affect sensitivity (i.e., neuroticism) (cf. Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005; Baumann et 
al., 2007; Baumann & Kuhl, 2002) and, therefore, to confirm the differential validity of the 
ACS-90 (Kuhl, 1994). Neuroticism was highly correlated to action orientation (r = -.67, p = 
.001) but not to action crises (averaged over all personal goals; r = .25, p = .162). For 
assessment of neuroticism, subjects completed the 24 dichotomous items (yes/no format) of 
the neuroticism subscale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Form A) (Eggert, 1983). The 
neuroticism subscale had good internal consistency (α = .83).  
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Regarding the relationship between rsFC and action crises, neuroticism and action 
orientation were considered as control variables to preclude the possibility that the 
relationship between an action crises and fronto-accumbal connectivity may be ascribed to a 
personality disposition (relevant to goal-related self-regulation, negative affect, or insecurity). 
 
SECTION E 
Magnetic resonance imaging. Brain scans were acquired on a 3-T Philips Ingenia 
whole-body scanner (Philips Medical Systems®, Best, The Netherlands) equipped with a 
transmit-receive body coil and a commercial 15-element sensitivity encoding head coil array. 
For each participant, one resting-state functional MRI and one diffusion-weighted sequence 
were obtained applying spin-echo echo-planar imaging. For resting-state functional MRI, 
subjects were instructed to keep their eyes closed and encouraged to let their mind wander, 
thinking of nothing in particular. 
Images of resting-state functional MRI were acquired with a spatial resolution of 3 x 3 
x 3 mm3 (reconstructed 1.72 x 1.72 x 3 mm3). Further imaging parameters were: repetition 
time, 2.2 s; echo time, 16 ms; field of view, 220 x 220 mm2; number of slices, 45; sensitivity 
encoding (SENSE) factor, 1.8. The resting-state functional MRI sequence lasted about 10 
min (corresponding to 260 brain volumes). Diffusion was measured along 64 non-collinear 
directions (b = 1000 s/mm2) preceded by a non-diffusion-weighted volume (reference 
volume, b = 0 s/mm2). Spatial resolution was 2 x 2 x 2 mm3. Further imaging parameters 
were: repetition time, 18,941.2 ms; echo time, 63.1 ms; field of view, 224 x 224 mm2; 
number of slices, 75; flip-angle, 90º; SENSE factor, 2.0. Acquisition of diffusion-weighted 
images lasted about 23 min. 
Functional imaging data preprocessing. Preprocessing included 1) slice timing 
correction, 2) realignment accounting for head movement during MRI, 3) linear and non-
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linear normalization onto a standard echo-planar imaging template, 4) voxel re-sampling to 2 
x 2 x 2 mm3, 5) smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full width at half maximum, 6) 
detrending, 7) filtering (such that only frequencies with 0.01 < f < 0.08 Hz passed), and 8) 
regressing out confounding variance of nine covariates: six parameters from head motion 
correction (three translation, three rotation parameters) as well as the global mean signal, 
white matter signal and cerebrospinal fluid signal based on standard masks implemented in 
SPM 8. For any subject, movement during resting-state functional MRI did not exceed 3 mm 
into any direction. 
Regions of interest definition. ROIs of left and right NAcc were anatomically 
defined through probability maps of the Harvard-Oxford Atlas 
(www.cma.mgh.harvard.edu/fsl_atlas.html) distributed with FSL 4.1.9 (Smith et al., 2004). 
Probability maps were extracted and thresholded at 40 percent, incorporating only those 
voxels with a probability of greater than 40 percent to be located within the NAcc. ROI of left 
FPC was defined according to exact topological information from previous evidence 
(Diekhof & Gruber, 2010). A 4-mm sphere centered at x = −24, y = 56, z = 4 (Montreal 
Neurological Institute space, coordinates averaged across four activation foci within left FPC 
as reported in Diekhof and Gruber (2010)) was created using Wake Forest University Pick 
Atlas 3.0 (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003). 
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Supplementary Results Study 2 
SECTION F 
Supplementary Table 2  
Means (SDs) and Zero-Order Correlations Among the Major Study Variables  
 
 
SECTION G 
Exploratory whole-brain analysis. On the single-subject level, whole-brain 
correlation maps were obtained for both seed ROIs separately using REST toolbox 1.6 (Song 
et al., 2011). These maps, storing voxel-wise correlation strength with the seed ROI, were r-
to-z-transformed to use them for group-level statistics. Random-effects analysis comprised a 
one-sample t-test examining whether each voxel’s z-value (i.e. the connection strength with 
the seed ROI) was different from zero, indicating either positive or negative resting-state 
functional connectivity (rsFC). Resulting statistical maps were thresholded at p < .001 with a 
cluster threshold of k = 20 voxels. These maps were used as masks for subsequent group-
level regression analysis (entering ACRISS as regressor) to examine only those voxels that 
are functionally connected with the NAcc. 
The whole-brain exploratory approach yielded additional regions whose connectivity 
with the NAcc was correlated with action crises in personal goals (see Supplementary Figure 
3 and Supplementary Table 3). Negative correlation maps were similar for left and right 
Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5
1.   Action crisis 2.57 (0.43)     −
2.   Action orientation (ACS-90) 9.00 (4.12) -.46**     −
3.   Left NAcc-left FPC functional connectivity 0.07 (0.17)  .49** -.35*     −
4.   Right Nacc-left FPC functional connectivity 0.10 (0.17)  .44** -.26  .78***     −
5.   Left Nacc-left FPC structural connectivity 1.54 (0.16)  .12  .06 -.10  .19     −
6.   Right Nacc-left FPC structural connectivity 1.78 (0.13) -.25 -.11 -.12  .02 -.01
Note. For action crisis, values are averaged over all three personal goals. ACS = Action Control 
Scale; NAcc = nucleus accumbens; FPC = anteroventral prefrontal/lateral frontopolar. Pearson 
bivariate correlations are presented here. 
*p  < .05. **p  < .01. ***p  < .001. 
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NAcc seed ROIs and included a cluster located in the left subgenual anterior cingulate 
cortex/ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Positive correlation maps showed right anterior insula 
(only left NAcc seed), and left ventral tegmental area (only left NAcc seed). Moreover, an 
identified cluster in the left (but not right) FPC reproduced the results obtained from the ROI-
based approach. The resulting maps of the whole-brain analysis showed regions which can all 
be allocated to a network that is associated with (control of) salience and reward processing. 
These regions have also been demonstrated to be basically linked to NAcc in the resting state 
(Cauda et al., 2011). Given the post-hoc like and exploratory character of this analysis as well 
as the application of a lenient statistical threshold, these results have to be interpreted with 
care. Findings may be taken into account in future research. 
 
Supplementary Table 3 
Regions whose connectivity with the nucleus accumbens is modulated by action crises  
 
 
 
 
location size coordinates T p location size coordinates T p
left FPC 11 -22, 58, 6 3.39 0.001 left FPC 15 -24, 58, 6 3.34 0.001
right anterior 
insula 33 36, 26, -4 3.37 0.001
left midbrain 
/ VTA 11 -8, -14, -14 2.81 0.004
negative left sgACC / 
vmPFC 13 -10, 40, -12 3.21 0.002
left sgACC / 
vmPFC 95 -10, 40, -10 4.76 0.001
Note.  Coordinates are reported in Montreal Neurological Institute standard space. Size is depicted in voxels (one voxel = 2 x 2 x 2 mm3). 
FPC = frontopolar cortex; VTA = ventral tegmental area; sgACC/vmPFC = subgenual anterior cingulate cortex/ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex.
Functional connectivity with left nucleus 
accumbens seed
Functional connectivity with right nucleus 
accumbens seed
cluster peak cluster peak
positive 
Correlation 
with action 
crises
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Supplementary Figure 3. Statistical maps showing clusters whose functional connectivity with the left nucleus 
accumbens in the resting state is modulated by action crises, either by a positive (A) or negative (B) correlation 
(p < .01 uncorrected, k ≥ 10 voxels, d = 31, T ≥ 2.45). The cluster in (B) with a negative correlation was also 
obtained when using right nucleus accumbens as seed region. 
 
SECTION H 
Fronto-accumbal structural connectivity and trait measures of action 
orientation. In relation to rsFC, structural connectivity might be considered more state-
independent. For that reason, we additionally assessed measures of fiber integrity (i.e., 
structural connectivity) when linking action orientation (i.e., trait-related aspects) to fronto-
accumbal connectivity. Fiber tracts are the anatomical basis for efficient and dynamic 
functional interactions between distant brain regions and represent the targets for assessments 
of structural connectivity. A commonly used measure of structural connectivity is fractional 
anisotropy, considered as an index of pathway integrity (Mori & Zhang, 2006). Based on the 
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considerable number of studies that identified action orientation as a predictor of effective 
goal pursuit (Baumann et al., 2005; Brunstein, 2001; Jostmann & Koole, 2009; Koole, 2004; 
Kuhl, 1981, 1992; Kuhl & Kazen, 1994), we examined whether action orientation is related 
to the integrity of tracts connecting left FPC to NAcc. 
Diffusion tensor imaging data were preprocessed (removing non-brain tissue (Smith, 
2002), head movement correction, gradient redefinition according to movement correction) 
and subsequently subjected to probabilistic fiber tractography using FMRIB diffusion toolbox 
2.0 implemented in FSL 4.1.9 (Smith et al., 2004) (www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Tractography 
was started in the left and right NAcc (seed ROI), respectively, to find a pathway to left FPC 
(waypoint and termination mask). When using left NAcc as seed, right NAcc was set as 
exclusion mask and vice versa. To facilitate tracking, the spherical ROI in the left FPC 
(already used in the rsFC analysis, see above) was dilated to a diameter of 12 mm for 
penetration into white matter. Default tracking parameters provided by FMRIB diffusion 
toolbox were used. Obtained tracts were normalized on the subject-specific level by dividing, 
voxel-wise, the number of streamlines passing through the voxel by the total number of 
obtained streamlines for the respective fiber tract (Bartsch, Biller, & Homola, 2009). 
Subsequently, tracts were thresholded such that only those voxels where at least 5 percent of 
the total number of streamlines passed were kept. Final tracts were back-transformed from 
Montreal Neurological Institute space into the native space of subjects and were used as 
subject-specific masks for extraction of within-tract fractional anisotropy from individual, 
non-normalized fractional anisotropy maps. In addition, mean fractional anisotropy across the 
whole brain was obtained for each individual to correct for possible global confounds by 
building the local-to-global ratio. Finally, tract-based relative mean fractional anisotropy was 
associated with action orientation (Kuhl, 1994) while statistically controlling for neuroticism 
(Eggert, 1983). 
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Due to unsuccessful tractography, one subject had to be excluded from the analysis. 
Integrity of fibers of an identified pathway between left NAcc and left FPC (see 
Supplementary Figure 4) was marginally significantly associated with action orientation (r = 
.30, p = .097). However, there was no significant correlation between action orientation and 
the tract between right NAcc and left FPC (r = -.01, p = .978). There was no significant 
correlation with action crisis (p’s ≥ .489). Moreover, there were no direct relations between 
fronto-accumbal functional and structural connectivity (all p’s ≥ .295). 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 4. White matter fiber tract interconnecting frontopolar cortex (green) and nucleus 
accumbens (red). Trajectory of the fiber bundle is presented as the mean fiber tract across all subjects. 
 
Regarding fronto-accumbal structural connectivity, we obtained slight evidence of a 
positive association between fiber integrity of an identified pathway connecting left FPC and 
left NAcc and action orientation. Although, due to the sample size, the effect should be 
interpreted cautiously, the result provides first evidence of a prefrontally centered neural 
basis of the volitional ability (of action oriented individuals) to regulate basic affect 
(Baumann et al., 2007). This may guide future studies in the assessment of how measures of 
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structural connectivity may predict dispositional action control and parallel the here 
established evidence of the relationship between rsFC and action crises. 
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 Abstract  
An action crisis, defined as the conflict between further goal pursuit and disengagement, has 
been shown to be associated with increased goal-related cost-benefit thinking. In the present 
research, it was evaluated to which extent an action crisis shares the characteristics of a 
postdecisional deliberative mindset (Gollwitzer, 2012) that is not restricted to the goal but, by 
procedural priming, affects goal-independent cognition. In Study 1, participants (n=190) 
experiencing an action crisis not merely reported more deliberative goal-related thoughts but, 
in a goal-independent task, ascribed more deliberative thoughts to a fairy-tale character. 
Based on the hypothesis that an action crisis in one goal, by the activation of a goal-
unspecific deliberative mindset, may transfer to other goals, we conducted Study 2 (n=204). 
On a correlational basis, an action crisis with respect to a particular goal could be predicted 
by the extent to which action crises were experienced in other goals. Results advance our 
understanding of how personal goals influence human cognition and behavior.  
Keywords: action crisis, mindset theory of action phases, cognitive 
tuning, procedural priming, goal disengagement
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Introduction 
Who has never, during her/his professional career or at the college, once reached a 
turning point (e.g., after having failed an exam) at which she/he was racking her/his brain 
over the question whether to keep following the present course of action (e.g., studying law) 
or choose a different path (e.g., studying art or entering the world of employment)? And who 
cannot completely empathize with someone who, after goal disengagement has become an 
option, is captured in such a (goal-related) decisional conflict in which either option is 
associated with both major benefits and considerable costs? This intra-psychic conflict 
between further goal pursuit and disengagement from the goal, which typically results from a 
loss of goal attainability (e.g., due to repeated setbacks) and/or desirability, has been termed 
as an action crisis (Brandstätter, Herrmann, & Schüler, in press; Brandstätter & Schüler, 
2013). Even though an action crisis not necessarily leads to goal disengagement (e.g., 
dropping out of college), it may be assumed that goal disengagement, vice versa, is typically 
preceded by an action crisis. As goal disengagement, especially if a goal is crucial to an 
individual’s identity (cf. Gollwitzer & Kirchhof, 1998), “can shake one’s self-image to its 
core” (Carver & Scheier, 2005, p. 536), action crises, even if consciously recognized, are 
difficult to resolve and therefore typically persist over a long period of time (i.e., usually at 
least several months; cf. Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2013) before a goal is abandoned.   
Theoretically, Brandstätter and Schüler (2013) defined the concept of an action crisis 
within the framework of mindset theory of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012; H. 
Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) that is based on the idea that the pursuit of a goal, in 
different action phases, is facilitated by the activation of a cognitive orientation (i.e., mindset) 
that meets the corresponding situational task requirements (Gollwitzer, 2012). In a series of 
experiments, Brandstätter and Schüler (2013) have provided initial evidence in support of the 
assumption that the experience of an action crisis, by drawing the attention to the weighing of 
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goal-related costs and benefits, is associated with a change in the cognitive orientation 
(mindset shift) of the individual.    
The pursuit of a goal, in mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 2012), is conceptualized as a 
sequence of four consecutive action phases: (a) deliberating (and choosing between 
alternative action goals; deliberative phase), (b) planning (postdecisional or implemental 
phase), (c) acting (actional phase), and (d) evaluating (postactional or evaluative phase). 
Each phase is associated with specific task demands: In the deliberative (or motivational1) 
phase, e.g., the focus lies on goal-setting and thereby on weighing up the pros and cons of 
different action alternatives, whereas the implemental and actional (i.e., volitional) phases 
involve planning the necessary action steps and acting on the goal, respectively. On the 
assumption that, in the course of goal pursuit, the phase-typical task demands are met by the 
activation of corresponding cognitive procedures, Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (Gollwitzer, 
Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; H. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; for an overview, see 
Gollwitzer, 2012) have provided abundant evidence for the distinctive characteristics of the 
mindsets (i.e., cognitive functioning) during goal setting (deliberative mindset) and goal 
striving (implemental and actional mindset), respectively. With respect to thought content, 
e.g., individuals who are concerned with making a decision between action alternatives were 
shown to weight up pros (benefits) and cons (costs), whereas individuals who are about to 
implement a goal focused on the concrete aspects of acting towards the goal (i.e., when, 
where, and how to implement the goal). In the latter group, costs and benefits were no longer 
relevant and thus not cognitively represented (H. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987).     
In mindset theory, the deliberative and the two volitional (i.e., implemental and 
actional) mindsets, owing to functional specificity, are hypothesized to be separated by “clear 
boundaries” (i.e., forming a goal intention) (Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2010, p. 276) and 
therefore “preclude each other” (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999, p. 419). Not completely in accord 
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with this hypothesis, an action crisis, due to the fact that the goal is being re-evaluated after 
having made a goal decision, may be conceptualized as a postdecisional deliberative phase. 
Even though a goal intention has already been formed and acted on, the individual becomes 
preoccupied with the dilemma between further goal pursuit and disengagement from the goal. 
As long as an action crisis persists, an individual typically continues both, to pursue the goal 
and to constantly weigh the costs and benefits of further goal pursuit against the cost and 
benefits of disengagement from the goal which, in an action crisis, are temporarily perceived 
as being balanced (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). Consistent with this idea, an action crisis, 
experimentally as well as longitudinally, could be linked to cognitive (i.e., memory 
processes) and neural (i.e., resting-state functional connectivity) processes characteristic of 
the predecisional deliberative mindset (Brandstätter et al., in press; Brandstätter & Schüler, 
2013; Herrmann, Baur, Brandstätter, Hänggi, & Jäncke, 2013). As a consequence of 
increased postdecisional cost-benefit thinking and, thereby, open-mindedness and 
impartiality, an action crisis has been found to give rise to a degrading of the goal (with 
respect to the cognitive evaluation of goal desirability and attainability) that may prepare the 
ground for disengagement processes (Brandstätter et al., in press; Gollwitzer, 2012). 
Whereas the cognitive correlates of an action crisis with respect to goal-dependent 
cognitive processes have already been analyzed (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013; Herrmann et 
al., 2013), so far, no research has focused on the consequences of action crises on goal-
independent cognition. Compelling evidence for the assumption that an action crisis results in 
a mindset shift, as posited by Brandstätter and Schüler (2013, p. 551), however, would be 
provided if it could be demonstrated that the cognitive orientation associated with an action 
crisis is not restricted to the focal goal, i.e., not goal-specific. If an action crisis, in fact, elicits 
a goal-unspecific deliberative mindset in the real sense of mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 1990, 
2012), the associated cognitive orientation should transfer to goal-independent tasks. The 
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hypothesis of a transfer to goal-independent tasks is supported by research on procedural 
priming (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2009; Smith & 
Branscombe, 1987; Tulving & Schacter, 1990), especially in the context2 of mindsets 
(Gollwitzer et al., 1990). Therefore, in the present article, we attempted to address the 
question as to what extent the experience of an action crisis in a self-relevant personal goal 
affects cognitive processes in a goal-independent context.  
As the finding of goal-related (i.e., goal-specific) cost-benefit thinking (Brandstätter 
& Schüler, 2013; Herrmann et al., 2013), which provides the rationale for the analysis of a 
goal-unspecific mindset in action crises, is based on self-report questionnaires, we performed 
a pre-study in which a thought-sampling was used (H. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). 
With the aim of reducing potential response bias of previous studies, we analyzed the 
consequences of action crises on the spontaneous goal-related stream of thought and, thereby, 
attempted to obtain conclusive evidence of a goal-specific mindset in an action crisis.  
In the following, we will outline the theoretical basis of our hypotheses and discuss 
how the present research, by analyzing procedural priming effects in the context of personal 
goals, may advance our understanding of the psychology of goals.  
Procedural priming, drawing on the concept of transfer appropriate processing 
(Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977) and processing shift theory (Schooler, 2002; Schooler, 
Fiore, & Brandimonte, 1997), has been defined as the priming of cognitive procedures (e.g., 
ways of processing information; Förster et al., 2009). Cognitive procedures, once activated 
(priming phase), remain active for a certain amount of time, even if the task is changed, and 
thereby may transfer to subsequent (test) tasks, on condition that the subsequent task allows 
for the adoption of the cognitive procedures activated in the priming phase (Förster et al., 
2009). Procedural priming effects have been observed in different contexts (e.g., creativity; 
Friedman, Fishbach, Förster, & Werth, 2003; self-regulation; Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 
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2006; inference formation; Kirmani, Lee, & Yoon, 2004). In contrast to semantic priming (cf. 
McNamara, 2005) and/or goal priming (cf. Moskowitz & Gesundheit, 2009), procedural 
priming is free of semantic content, not dependent on dynamic motivational processes, i.e., 
“relatively insensitive to changes in value and expectancy” (Förster et al., 2009, p. 182), and 
not attributable to learning processes. Whereas procedural priming effects may be conceived 
of as the consequence of (the adaptation of the cognitive apparatus to) the task requirements 
of a previous situation and, therefore, are of no adaptive value for the ongoing task, goal 
priming represents a prime example of adaptive functional flexibility. Goal priming effects 
may not merely increase over time and systematically vary with the expectancy and value of 
a goal, but account for goal shielding, and, furthermore, are counterbalanced if a goal has 
been achieved (Förster et al., 2009; Kruglanski et al., 2002). However, in contrast to the 
extensive research on goal priming (cf. Moskowitz & Gesundheit, 2009), the significance of 
procedural priming for goal-related self-regulation has not been subject to systematic 
scientific study, even though it is “a legitimate matter of interest whether intentional goal 
pursuits in one context influence the individual’s decisions and behavior in subsequent 
contexts” (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, p. 265). In the present article, we illustrate, with the 
concept of an action crisis, how procedural priming (within goal systems) may become 
relevant to the pursuit of long-term goals (in everyday life).   
The present research was inspired by a pioneer study on procedural priming by 
Gollwitzer et al. (1990) in which evidence for a “mind-set congruency effect” (p. 1122) was 
provided. Gollwitzer et al. (1990) demonstrated that mindsets, once activated by task-specific 
demands, are “rather long-lived” (p. 1123) phenomena, i.e., are not restricted to the context 
that triggered the mindset but tune thought production in subsequent independent tasks. 
Based on these results, we analyzed “carry-over” effects of action crises. As an action crisis, 
through the process of reflecting on the personal goal (priming phase), is posited to elicit a 
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deliberative mindset that exists abstracted from the specific (goal) context, this cognitive 
orientation, in a mindset congruous direction, was assumed to transfer to subsequent 
unrelated (i.e., goal-independent) tasks. Evidence on “carry-over” effects would support the 
theory of an action crisis as a postdecisional deliberative action phase that differs from the 
volitional (i.e., implemental and actional) action phases defined within mindset theory 
(Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012). However, in contrast to Gollwitzer et al. (1990), we applied a 
quasi-experimental approach as (deliberative vs. implemental) mindsets were not 
experimentally induced through task requirements (deliberating on vs. planning a decision) 
but indirectly via goal activation. A deliberative mindset was hypothesized to become 
activated to the extent to which an action crisis was experienced in the respective personal 
goal (e.g., becoming a lawyer).    
In light of the ubiquitous presence of (especially highly self-relevant) personal goals 
in people’s everyday life (Moskowitz & Grant, 2009), one might reason that the deliberative 
way of processing information characteristic of an action crisis may transfer to a wide array 
of goal-independent cognitive processes (e.g., cognitive processes associated with other 
goals).  
The present research. Following the methodological approach applied by H. 
Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987, Study 1) and Gollwitzer et al. (1990, Study 1), we 
analyzed in Study 1 (a) how the experience of an action crisis affects the contents of the 
spontaneous stream of goal-related thoughts (goal-specific mindset effect) and (b) whether 
changes in cognitive functioning, which are associated with an action crisis, have an effect on 
cognition in goal-independent tasks (goal-unspecific mindset effect). In Study 2, based on the 
results of Study 1, we explored (on a correlational basis) if individuals’ goal systems offer 
evidence of a “contagion effect”, i.e., if an action crisis with respect to a particular goal, after 
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having controlled for potential confounders, may be predicted by the extent to which an 
action crisis is experienced in other goals.  
Statistical analyses. In the present manuscript, regression analyses were calculated 
using the IBM® SPSS® software (version 20; IBM® SPSS® Statistics Inc., Armonk, NY). In 
Study 1, owing to not ideally normally distributed dependent variables, all significant beta-
weights were validated using bootstrap resampling. Therefore, additional bootstrap estimates, 
standard errors, p-values, and 95 percent bias-corrected confidence intervals are provided. To 
perform bootstrap analyses, which were based on 1’000 bootstrap samples, and model 
comparisons (Study 2), we applied the structural equation modeling technique with the IBM® 
SPSS® Amos software (version 20; IBM® SPSS® Statistics Inc., Armonk, NY) using the 
maximum-likelihood method. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, a student sample was selected. For all students, the pursuit of one’s studies 
was defined as a (nomothetic) personal goal. This strategy ascertained that a highly self-
relevant “Be” goal that reflects long-term career plans and, hence, is deeply connected to the 
self, was analyzed (cf. Carver & Scheier, 2005, p. 536; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 
2003).  
Study 1 consisted of two quasi-experiments that were separated by an interval of six 
weeks. At T1 (pre-study), in the middle of the semester, students were instructed to deliberate 
on their studies and, subsequently, completed a thought-sampling questionnaire (cf. H. 
Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). It was posited that an action crisis is characterized by an 
emphasized deliberative (goal) reflection (goal-specific mindset effect).  
At the end of the semester (T2), students were at first required to deliberate on their 
studies (in the course of filling out a goal-related questionnaire consisting of 30 items). In the 
second part of the quasi-experiment, students were introduced to an alleged creativity task in 
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which three unfinished fairy tales had to be completed (cf. Gollwitzer et al., 1990). In line 
with research on procedural priming (Förster et al., 2009), we hypothesized students creative 
endings to the incomplete fairy tales to be influenced by the degree of experienced action 
crisis. It was postulated that experiencing an action crisis is mirrored by ascribing more 
deliberative efforts to the fairytale figures (goal-unspecific mindset effect).  
At T2, the administration of a goal-related questionnaire, which aimed at inducing a 
systematic evaluation of one’s studies, thus served as the priming phase. In students suffering 
from an action crisis, goal evaluation was hypothesized to result in the activation of a 
deliberative mindset (e.g., weighing pros and cons) that, consequently, should be transferred 
to the (ostensibly independent) task of completing fairy tales (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013; 
Förster et al., 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 1990; Smith & Branscombe, 1987). Hence, we did not 
analyze procedural priming following an experimental manipulation of cognitive processes 
(e.g., deliberating a change decision versus planning the implementation of a personal 
project; cf. Gollwitzer et al., 1990), but, by instructing participants to evaluate a highly self-
relevant personal goal, explored the effect of an indirect mindset induction (via goal 
activation). Therefore, as participants, in the priming phase, were merely required to 
complete a questionnaire and not to actively engage in an experimental procedure, the study 
design was not susceptible to demand effects (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). The potential of the 
cognitive procedures, which were activated during goal evaluation (priming phase), to 
transfer to an independent task was increased by the “field character” of the study (i.e., the 
idiographic nature of personal goals).  
From the fact that mental resources are limited (Baddeley, 1986; Norman & Bobrow, 
1975) follows the conclusion that a preoccupation with the re-evaluation of a goal in an 
action crisis has to result in a reallocation of cognitive resources. An intensified deliberative 
reflection in individuals experiencing an action crisis (in the pre-study at T1), consequently, 
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should be associated with a compensatory reduction in cognitive effort (i.e., thoughts) 
devoted to the implementation of the goal. Successful goal pursuit, however, not merely 
requires thoughts related to the planning and enactment of the goal, but, equally important, 
monitoring processes (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990; Liberman & Dar, 2009; G. A. Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). Especially with long-term goals, which are pursued in constantly 
changing contexts, continuous goal monitoring, a prerequisite to the introduction of 
adaptations, constitutes an integral part of successful self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 
1998). Whereas Gollwitzer (1990, p. 59) acknowledged the potential benefits of postactional 
evaluation for future planning, monitoring processes during goal striving (i.e., postdecisional 
evaluative processes) were neither subject to theoretical considerations nor empirical research 
(Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2010).  
Even though the deliberative and evaluative action phases differ with respect to the 
focus of information processing (goal setting vs. goal evaluation) and, furthermore, the 
evaluative cognitive orientation has not been studied empirically, both action phases “are 
expected to encompass motivational phenomena and processes in the classic sense of the 
term” (Gollwitzer, 2012, p. 528). Therefore, because motivational (high-level construal) and 
volitional (low-level construal; Trope & Liberman, 2010) processes are “independent of each 
other” (p. 419) and, owing to functional incompatibility, “cannot coexist” (Gollwitzer & 
Bayer, 1999, p. 420), we hypothesized the increase in deliberative thoughts in action crises to 
be at the cost of evaluative processes. Hence, in the pre-study at T1, for individuals 
experiencing an action crisis, we assumed increased deliberation to be associated with a 
compensatory decrease in evaluative processes.   
The hypothesis of a redistribution of cognitive resources within motivational 
processes corresponds to the idea “that making a goal decision creates a rather durable 
commitment to pursue this goal” (Gollwitzer, 1990, p. 62), with the consequence that 
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hindrances to goal achievement lead to a phase of invigoration (Klinger, 1975), i.e., increases 
in effort and the employment of different means. Following the current theory that goal-
related failure experiences, which may precede an action crisis, are succeeded by increased 
volitional efforts (Brunstein, 2000; see also Klinger, 1975), an action crisis was not posited to 
account for a reduction in the strength of the volitional mindset. This line of thought is 
supported by J. Heckhausen, Wrosch, and Schulz (2010, p. 39) who theorized that, in the 
course of goal pursuit, volitional efforts should remain unaffected by goal-reevaluation 
processes.    
Method 
Participants.  
Of the 190 students of the University of Zurich, Switzerland, participating in the 
online study in the middle of (T1) and at the end of the winter term (T2), one student had to 
be excluded from the final sample (n = 189, 136 women, Mage = 25.98 years, SDage = 7.21, 
age range: 19–61 years, 15 psychology students) due to non-compliance with the study 
instructions. Participants were recruited via an email that, on request, was delivered by an 
official e-mail distributor of the University of Zurich, Switzerland. In compensation for 
completing an online questionnaire at two time points, participants received a coupon of the 
value of  €14 (approximately $18) of a popular mail-order company. 
Research design at T1 (pre-study). 
Goal-related thought production. After having deliberated on their studies for 90 
seconds, participants were interrupted and instructed to report on their thoughts (goal-specific 
mindset effect). To prevent response bias, the task of reporting on their thoughts was not 
announced to the participants prior to the interruption. A valid recall of thoughts was 
facilitated by asking participants, following the procedure reported by H. Heckhausen and 
Gollwitzer (1987), to start with the retrieval of the most recent thought from short-term 
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memory (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Subsequently, the second most recent thought should 
be reported, to be followed by the first thought and every thought in between. Participants 
were provided with four separate empty fields to write down their thoughts in the required 
order.        
Thoughts were scored according to a coding scheme with three different categories. 
The deliberative category (M = .87) was scored if a student (a) was weighing up pros and 
cons (e.g., of a pending decision), (b) was ruminating about a decision that has already been 
implemented, (c) was deliberating on the expectancy and desirability of the focal or 
alternative goals (e.g., alternative subject areas), or (d) was preoccupied with feelings of 
helplessness (cf. state orientation,  Kuhl, 1994b, p. 11). Scoring the volitional category (M = 
1.88) required participants (a) to think about the implementation of actions (e.g., planning 
processes) or (b) to develop a goal-related strategy. The volitional category, furthermore, 
drawing on Kuhl (1984, 1992, 2000), was scored if participants thoughts (c) aimed at up-
regulating positive (i.e., self-motivation) or down-regulating negative affect (i.e., self-
relaxation), as both strategies, ultimately, “should result in behavioral and volitional 
facilitation” (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2007, p. 241). The evaluative category (M = .65) 
included (a) conclusions about and evaluations of past decision, events, and actions as well as 
(b) the exploration of the corresponding implications (in the absence of implementation 
intentions, cf. above). 
Interrater reliability was calculated based on 100 sentences that were coded by two 
independent blind raters. Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) was 0.71 for the deliberative, 0.69 for 
the volitional, and 0.78 for the evaluative category, indicating substantial agreement for all 
three categories (Landis & Koch, 1977, p. 165).  
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Research design at T2. 
Goal-independent thought production. To analyze peoples goal-independent thought 
production (goal-unspecific mindset effect), drawing on Gollwitzer et al. (1990), participants 
were asked to complete an alleged creativity test in which the dilemmatic beginning of three 
fairy tales had to be continued. Therefore, participants were provided with three empty fields 
to continue each fairy tale with three sentences. All three fairy tales were borrowed from 
Gollwitzer et al. (1990, p. 1121), whereby the first fairy tale read as follows: 
 
Once upon a time there was a king who loved the queen dearly. When the queen died, 
he was left with his only daughter. The widowed king adored the little princess who 
grew up to be the most beautiful maiden that anyone had ever seen. When the princess 
turned 15, war broke out and her father had to go to battle. The king, however, did not 
know of anyone with whom he could entrust his daughter while he was away at war. 
The king... (p. 1121) 
 
Subjects’ sentences were coded according to a coding scheme that was theoretically 
derived from mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012) and followed the examples provided 
by Gollwitzer et al. (1990, p. 1127). On condition that a sentence applied to the main 
character of the fairy tale, it could be coded for either the deliberative or volitional category. 
Coding the deliberative category required the main character to (a) deliberate on the 
dilemma, (b) asking for advice (e.g., a clairvoyant), or (c) to be troubled by a feeling of 
helplessness (cf. state orientation,  Kuhl, 1994b, p. 11). The volitional category included (a) 
the planning and implementation of goal-directed actions, (b) actual goal-oriented behavior 
(e.g., negotiating a peace agreement), and (c) to issue orders (e.g., to knights) that aim at 
solving the dilemma. In case a sentence contained several parts, both (mutually exclusive) 
categories could be coded for different constituents. To determine interrater reliability, 100 
sentences were coded by two independent blind raters. Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) was 
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0.90 for the deliberative and 0.90 for the volitional category, indicating high agreement for 
both categories (Landis & Koch, 1977, p. 165). Owing to the inherent structure of fairy tales 
in general and especially of endings, which usually “require the main character to take 
action” (cf. Gollwitzer et al., 1990, p. 1122) for the fairy tale to receive a conclusion, on 
average, the sum of scores for the deliberative category was considerably lower (M = 1.44) 
than for the volitional category (M = 4.63). Per participant, on average, 3.31 (of total nine) 
sentences could not be assigned to one of the two categories.  
Measures at T1 and T2.  
Action crisis. The extent to which participants were experiencing an action crisis 
regarding their studies, at T1 and T2, was (prior to the thought-sampling and the fairy tales, 
respectively) assessed using the six-item (e.g., “I have doubts whether I should continue 
striving for my goal or disengage from it.”) Action Crisis Scale (ACRISS; Brandstätter et al., 
in press; Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013), the items of which were slightly adapted for the 
present research question (e.g., “I have doubts whether I should continue my studies or drop 
out of university.”). Items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (no agreement) to 5 (very 
much agreement) (T1: M = 2.37, SD = .81; T2: M = 2.23, SD = .77; αs ≥ .80).  
Control variables. As students, at the time of measurement (i.e., at T1 and T2), 
differed with respect to the stage of their studies (i.e., the distance to the goal or rather goal 
progress; cf. Forster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998) and, furthermore, were doing different degrees 
in different faculties, i.e., substantially varied in goal importance and investment (Kuhl, 2000; 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), these variables that may have had an effect on depth and 
intensity of the evaluation of one’s studies (cf. Gollwitzer, 2012, p. 539) and, therefore, 
procedural priming, were considered as control variables. Furthermore, we controlled for 
action vs. state orientation (Kuhl, 1994a), a personality disposition highly relevant to self-
regulation, because “the construct of state orientation overlaps with ... [the] deliberative 
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mindset (Gollwitzer, 1990)” (Kuhl, 1994b, p. 11) (cf. Tables 1 and 2).  
Goal importance. Goal importance was assessed using a four-item instrument (e.g., 
“My studies are important to me.”) with a Likert scale ranging from 1 (no agreement) to 5 
(very much agreement) (T1: M = 4.13, SD = .71; T2: M = 4.13, SD = .71; αs ≥ .80).   
Goal progress. Goal progress was (at T1) operationalized by both the number of 
semesters already studied at the university (M = 6.70, SD = 5.24) and to be spent to receive 
the master’s degree (M = 4.98, SD = 3.77) (r = -.09, p = .222).  
Goal investment. Participants had to estimate the percentage of time resources (from 1 
to 100 percent) they were currently investing in the pursuit or their studies (T1: M = 58.84, 
SD = 23.34; T2: M = 44.39, SD = 27.46).    
Action Orientation. Action orientation was measured (at T2) using the 24-item Action 
Control Scale  (e.g., “When I must finish something soon: (a) I find it easy to get it done. (b) I 
have to push myself to get started.”) (ACS-90; Kuhl, 1994a) (α = .75).  
Results  
 Results (i.e., the means) concerning goal importance and investment (cf. above) 
clearly indicated that studying provides an excellent example of a highly self-relevant goal. In 
view of the substantial amount of time invested in studying, the conclusion seems warranted 
that the cognitive orientation, which is associated with the pursuit of this goal, holds the 
potential to transfer to a wide array of goal-independent activities.  
In the following, results are discussed separately for goal-related thought production 
(pre-study at T1) and goal-independent thought production (T2). The relationship between 
the extent to which participants were experiencing an action crisis (with respect to their 
studies) and goal-related thought production (T1) and goal-independent thought production 
(T2) was evaluated with hierarchical linear regression analyses, the results of which were 
validated using bootstrap resampling technique (see Tables 1 and 2).  
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Goal-dependent thought production. Because students, at T1, were in the middle of 
the semester, the majority of thoughts (M = 1.88), not surprisingly, referred to the 
implementation of the goal. As expected, an action crisis did not influence the amount of 
volitional thoughts (β = .05, p = .580), but was positively associated with deliberative 
reflection (β = .24, p = .007; bootstrap estimates: β = .24, SE = .088, p = .007 [C.I. 
.057/.412]), at the cost of evaluative processes (β = -.21, p = .004; bootstrap estimate: β = -
.20, SE = .071, p = .009 [C.I. -.333/-.063]) (see Table 1). Thus, it may be concluded that 
increased goal-related deliberation in action crises is not associated with a compensatory 
reduction in volitional but evaluative processes that, especially with long-term goals, serve as 
an important information basis for the planning and enactment of the goal (Carver & Scheier, 
1998).   
Table 1 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Deliberative, Volitional, and Evaluative Thoughts in a 
Thought-Sampling Questionnaire From Action Crisis With Respect to One’s Studies (Study 1 at T1) 
 
Goal-independent thought production. As can be seen from Table 2, an action 
crisis, in line with the results from the prestudy at T1, was predictive of ascribing deliberative 
(β = .24, p = .006; bootstrap estimates: β = .24, SE = .089, p = .011 [C.I. .051/.396]) but not 
volitional (β = -.01, p = .958) efforts to the main character of the fairy tales to be completed 
in the goal-independent task. Answering questions regarding one’s studies, to the extent to 
which an action crisis was experienced in the goal, resulted in the activation of a deliberative 
ΔR 2 β ΔR 2 β ΔR 2 β
.10** .13*** .39***
Control variablesa
.04** .00 .03**
Action crisis  .24**  .05 -.21**
.13*** .13*** .41***
n 189 189 189
Volitional thougths
**p  < .01. ***p  < .001. 
Step 2
Total R 2
Deliberative thoughts
Step 1
Predictor
aControl variables included action orientation, goal progress, goal investment, goal importance, 
and total number of codings.
Evaluative thougths
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mindset that “continued to be active and operate in the second task, without participants 
being aware of or intentionally choosing this mode of thought while writing the story 
endings” (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, p. 266) 
Table 2 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Deliberative and Volitional Efforts Ascribed to the Main 
Characters of the Three Fairy Tales From Action Crisis With Respect to One’s Studies (Study 1 at T2) 
 
Discussion 
An action crisis, as hypothesized, while giving rise to increased goal-specific 
deliberative reflection (pre-study at T1) and, one a more abstract level, a goal-unspecific 
deliberative mindset (T2), seems to have no impact on (at least the amount of) volitional 
thoughts. 
The results of Study 1 not merely provide evidence on the thought structure of the 
goal-related mindset associated with an action crisis but, more importantly, on potential 
mechanisms (i.e., procedural priming) by which an action crisis may impact cognitive 
processes in an array of goal-independent activities.  
Study 2 
Based on the results of Study 1, which lend support to the hypothesis that an action 
crisis in one goal may transfer to other goals, we conducted Study 2. On a correlational basis, 
we attempted to obtain evidence of a “contagion effect” of action crises in individuals’ goal 
systems. If action crises indeed transfer to other goals, an action crisis in a particular goal, to 
ΔR 2 β ΔR 2 β
.06+ .06+
Control variablesa
.04** .00
Action crisis  .24** -.01
.10** .06
n 189 189
Volitional efforts
aControl variables included action orientation, goal progress, goal 
investment, goal importance, and number of w ords w ritten.
+p  < .10. **p  < .01. 
Step 2
Total R 2
Deliberative efforts
Step 1
Predictor
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some degree, should, over and above the effect of goal characteristics and personality 
dispositions (i.e., even after having controlled for potential confounders), be predictable by 
the extent to which action crises are experienced in other goals. 
 In the present study, for mainly two reasons, several goal-relevant constructs were 
measured and considered as control variables. Firstly, we attempted to preclude the 
possibility that the prediction of an action crisis in one goal by (the overall degree of) action 
crises in other goals may be ascribed to a personality disposition (relevant to goal striving and 
goal disengagement). Secondly, we aimed at evaluating the incremental predictive value of 
(the overall degree of) action crises within a goal system over and above goal-characteristics 
that have previously been shown to be associated with the experience of an action crisis 
(Brandstätter et al., in press). These goal characteristics (e.g., goal self-concordance, cf. 
below), moreover, may be highly correlated between two goals within the same context, 
especially if the two (e.g., academic) goals serve the same superordinate goal (e.g., becoming 
a physician), and, if not controlled for, could partly account for an action crisis in one goal 
being predictive of the extent of action crises in other goals (of the same context).    
As procedural priming is free of semantic content and not context-specific, conclusive 
evidence of a “contagion effect” would be provided if it was shown that a predictive effect is 
not restricted to a specific area of life (e.g., academia). Therefore, participants were required 
to list two personally relevant academic and two leisure goals. Statistically, it was evaluated 
whether an action crisis with respect to a particular goal may be predicted, after having 
controlled for the action crisis of the same context, by the extent to which action crises were 
experienced in the different context. In these analyses, action crises were averaged across the 
two goals of the different context (cf. Tables 3 to ). As composite variables have better 
psychometric properties than individual variables, a composite measure (of the action crises 
regarding the two goals of the different context) was intended to compensate for the fact that 
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the predictive value of an action crisis is expected to be higher within the same context (e.g., 
owing to frequent co-occurrence). 
Method 
Participants.  
Two hundred and four actual or former psychology students (162 women, Mage = 
27.66 years, SDage = 6.43, age range: 22-57 years) of the University of Zurich, Switzerland, 
participated in an online study after having been recruited by an email list of the department 
of psychology. Participants received a coupon of the value of €10 (approximately $13) of a 
popular mail-order company in compensation for completing an online questionnaire.  
Measures. 
Personal goals. Participants, after having read a description of the goal concept 
(Brunstein, 1993; Emmons, 1986), were instructed to list two personally relevant academic 
(or vocational3) and two leisure goals they were striving for (and intended to pursue in the 
near future). 
Action crisis. Action crises regarding personal goals were assessed with the ACRISS 
(cf. Study 1; Brandstätter et al., in press; Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013) (.75 ≤ α ≤ .80). For 
statistical analyses, action crises were averaged across the two academic and two leisure 
goals, respectively (cf. above). 
Control variables.  
Goal attainability. Participants rated goal attainability (item: “I think chances are high 
that I’m going to attain this goal.”) on a scale ranging from 1 (no agreement) to 5 (very much 
agreement). 
Goal desirability. Goal desirability (item: “This goal is important to me.”), for every 
personal goal, was assessed on a scale ranging from 1 (no agreement) to 5 (very much 
agreement). 
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Goal progress. For the two academic and two leisure goals, participants were asked to 
indicate the subjective level of progress in percent (1 = “no goal progress at all”; 100 = “full 
goal progress”).   
Goal self-concordance. Goal self-concordance was assessed with the four-item self-
concordance scale (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Personal goals had to be rated (on a nine-point 
scale from 1 = “no true at all” to 9 = “totally true”) with respect to four reasons (i.e., external, 
introjected, identified, and intrinsic motivation) representing ”a continuum of perceived locus 
of causality for behavior (Ryan & Connell, 1989), ranging from noninternalized to 
completely internalized” (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999, p. 486). A self-concordance index was 
built by subtracting the introjected and external scores from the identified and intrinsic scores 
(Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Reliability was only mediocre (α ≤ .45) for academic goals and 
considerably low for leisure goals (α ≤ .27) what, presumably, is attributable to the fact that 
even highly self-concordant academic goals (e.g., “I want to understand statistics.”) and 
leisure goals (e.g., “I want to quit smoking.”) are frequently, to some extent, imposed by the 
social (e.g., family) or academic (e.g., curriculum) context.  
Goal adjustment capacities. Goal adjustment capacities (i.e., goal disengagement and 
goal reengagement), as having been proven to be highly relevant to adaptive self-regulation 
(e.g., coping), especially in stressful circumstances that may give rise to the development of 
an action crisis (e.g., Wrosch, Amir, & Miller, 2011), in the present study, were identified as 
potential dispositional predictors of action crises. Goal disengagement and reengagement 
capacities were assessed with a four-item and six-item questionnaire, respectively, introduced 
and validated by Wrosch and colleagues (e.g., G. E. Miller & Wrosch, 2007; Wrosch & 
Miller, 2009; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). Following the generic term 
“If I have to stop pursuing an important goal in my life...”, participants indicated how they 
usually react (goal disengagement: e.g., “I stay committed to the goal for a long time. I can’t 
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let it go.”, α = .85; goal reengagement: e.g., “I convince myself that I have other meaningful 
goals to pursue.”, α = .91) when they are forced to stop pursuing an important personal goal 
(Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, et al., 2003, p. 1197).  
Results 
To address our research question, we performed, for each goal separately, a 
hierarchical linear regression analysis, whereby the experienced action crisis was regressed 
upon goal-related control variables (step 1), personality dispositions (step 2), and action 
crises in the three other goals (step 3). In step 3, we separately entered the action crisis with 
respect to the goal of the same context and the composite measure of the action crises 
regarding the two goals of the different context. Therefore, in step 3 of the regression 
analyses, we evaluated whether, as hypothesized, the predictive value of an action crisis with 
respect to a particular goal for the action crises experienced in other goals is not a context-
specific phenomenon. As an action crisis was associated with a goal-unspecific deliberative 
mindset in Study 1, a “contagion effect” should not be limited to a specific context (e.g., 
academia) (see Tables 3 to 6).4         
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Table 3 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Action Crisis With Respect to Academic Goal 1 From 
Action Crises Regarding Academic Goal 2 and Leisure Goals (Study 2) 
 
Table 4 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Action Crisis With Respect to Academic Goal 2 From 
Action Crises Regarding Academic Goal 1 and Leisure Goals (Study 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ΔR 2 β
.35***
Control variablesa
.02+
GAT
.07***
Action crisis academic goal 2  .25***
Action crisis leisure goals  .11+
.44***
n 204
+p  < .10. ***p  < .001.
Note. GAT = goal adjustment tendencies. For leisure goals, values are 
averaged over the tw o goals. 
Step 3
Total R 2
Action crisis academic goal 1
Step 1
Step 2
Predictor
aControl variables included desirability, attainability, progress, and self-
concordance of academic goal 1. 
ΔR 2 β
.31***
Control variablesa
.05***
GAT
.08***
Action crisis academic goal 1  .24***
Action crisis leisure goals  .13*
.43***
n 204
*p < .05. ***p  < .001.  
Note. GAT = goal adjustment tendencies. For leisure goals, values are 
averaged over the tw o goals. 
Step 3
Total R 2
Action crisis academic goal 2
Step 1
Step 2
Predictor
aControl variables included desirability, attainability, progress, and self-
concordance of academic goal 2. 
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Table 5 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Action Crisis With Respect to Leisure Goal 1 From 
Action Crises Regarding Leisure Goal 2 and Academic Goals (Study 2) 
 
Table 6 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Action Crisis With Respect to Leisure Goal 2 From 
Action Crises Regarding Leisure Goal 1 and Academic Goals (Study 2) 
 
With exception of the action crisis in the second leisure goal (cf. Table 5), on a 
descriptive level, action crises could be better predicted by the action crisis of the same 
context than the averaged action crises of the different context. This pattern of results could 
be explained by the fact that the probability for priming effects to last is dependent on the co-
ΔR 2 β
.37***
Control variablesa
.02+
GAT
.07***
Action crisis leisure goal 2  .16**
Action crisis academic goals  .19**
.45***
n 204
+p  < .10. **p  < .01. ***p  < .001.
Note. GAT = goal adjustment tendencies. For academic goals, values are 
averaged over the tw o goals. 
Step 3
Total R 2
Action crisis leisure goal 1
Step 1
Step 2
Predictor
aControl variables included desirability, attainability, progress, and self-
concordance of leisure goal 1. 
ΔR 2 β
.47***
Control variablesa
.02*
GAT
.07***
Action crisis leisure goal 1  .19***
Action crisis academic goals  .16**
.56***
n 204
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p  < .001.  
Note. GAT = goal adjustment tendencies. For academic goals, values are 
averaged over the tw o goals. 
Step 3
Total R 2
Action crisis leisure goal 2
Step 1
Step 2
Predictor
aControl variables included desirability, attainability, progress, and self-
concordance of leisure goal 2. 
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occurrence of two goals (i.e., the pursuit of one goal is followed by the pursuit of the other 
goal) that may be increased within a specific context. However, when the two corresponding 
paths (cf. step 3, Tables 3 to 6), in each of the four regression analyses, were set to equality 
using structural equation modeling, model comparisons in all four analyses (∆df = 1, ∆X2 ≤ 
1.4, all ps ≥ .24) indicated non-significant differences between the context-specific and -
unspecific effect (Byrne, 2010). The, on a mere descriptive level, generally increased size of 
the beta-weights of action crises regarding academic goals may be attributable to the typically 
exceptionally large amount of time invested in academic goals (cf. Study 1) and the fact that 
academic goals (M = 4.63, SE = 0.04) were assessed to be more important (t(203) = 5.60, p < 
.001, r = .37) than leisure goals (M = 4.36, SE = 0.04) in Study 2. 
Discussion 
Even though the results, due to the cross-sectional and correlational nature of the data, 
should be interpreted with reserve, the consistent pattern across the four personal goals of two 
different contexts supports the idea of a (goal-unspecific) “contagion effect”. However, in 
spite of considering an adequate number of control variables and the, consequently, 
substantial amount of explained variance (cf. Tables 3 to 6), we cannot exclude the possibility 
that a (e.g., dispositional) variable, which was not measured in the present study, explains the 
shared variance of action crises in different goals. 
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General Discussion 
Study 1, which consisted of two quasi-experiments, was conducted following the 
methodological procedure described by H. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987, Study 1) and 
Gollwitzer et al. (1990, Study 1). As a first step (pre-study at T1), we analyzed the effects of 
an action crisis on the spontaneous goal-related stream of thought (goal-specific mindset) 
and, as a second consecutive step (at T2), evaluated how the way of processing information 
characteristic of an action crisis, by procedural priming, transfers to goal-independent 
cognition (goal-unspecific mindset). In Study 2, we tested, based on the idea of a “contagion 
effect”, to which extent an action crisis in a particular goal may be predicted by the degree to 
which action crises are experienced in other goals, after having controlled for goal-relevant 
control variables.     
In Study 1, at T1 (pre-study), we found an action crisis to result in a trade-off between 
deliberative reflection and evaluative processes, whereas the amount of volitional thoughts 
remained unaffected by the intra-psychic goal conflict. This finding corresponds to the idea, 
which originated from mindset theory (e.g., Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2010), that, once a goal 
intention has been formed, the volitional mindset is unaffected by postdecisional deliberation 
on the goal  (J. Heckhausen et al., 2010; Nenkov & Gollwitzer, 2012). The assumption, 
however, that “once a decision is made, further deliberative reflection is precluded” (H. 
Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987, p. 103), could not be supported by the present results. 
Although the total amount of cognitive effort devoted to the implementation of a goal seemed 
to have remained constant in an action crisis, this did not apply to the relative proportion of 
volitional (to deliberative) thoughts, whereby the functionality of the resulting cognitive 
orientation, with respect to goal pursuit, may have become impaired. Contrary to this 
reasoning, one could argue, with recourse to the terminology of mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 
2012), that the relative proportion of volitional to motivational (i.e., deliberative and 
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evaluative) thoughts was unaffected by the experience of an action crisis. In this line of 
argument, however, the fact is ignored that deliberative and evaluative (i.e., monitoring) 
processes, with respect to goal pursuit, are functionally different. Especially with long-term 
goals, continuous evaluation, in contrast to postdecisional deliberation, serves as an 
informational basis for volitional processes and, thereby, constitutes a prerequisite to 
improvement and the implementation of adaptations (Carver & Scheier, 1998). Initial 
evidence for the idea that a trade-off between deliberative and evaluative processes, which 
results from an action crisis, may affect volitional functionality has been provided by 
Brandstätter and Schüler (2013, Study 2) who reported effects of action crises on recognition 
in incidental learning. In an experimental scenario study, “action crisis participants showed a 
significantly weaker memory advantage for implementation-related over cost–benefit-related 
material in comparison to non-action crisis participants” (p. 547).  
The idea that an individual’s cognitive functioning is altered in action crises is, 
moreover, strongly supported by the procedural priming effects found at T2 in Study 1. Even 
though at T2, as at T1, volitional efforts (ascribed to the fairytale figure) were unaffected by 
the degree of experienced action crisis, an action crisis was positively associated with a goal-
unspecific deliberative mindset. This mindset shift, in line with research reported by 
Brandstätter and Schüler (2013, Study 2), supports the hypothesis that an action crisis affects 
the functionality of the volitional mindset. We therefore arrived at the conclusion that the 
“qualitative leap” (H. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987, p. 103), which results from forming a 
goal intention, is, to some extent, counterbalanced in an action crisis. However, even though 
an action crisis is characterized by increased goal-specific deliberative reflection as well as a 
goal-unspecific deliberative mindset, results of Study 1 (at T1 and T2) clearly indicate that 
the cognitive orientation (in an action crisis) remains predominantly volitional. This seems to 
be the logical consequence when considering that an action crisis, by definition, emerges 
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while a goal is being pursued. Thus, as long as an action crisis is not resolved, an individual is 
“doing the splits” between deliberating on and pursuing a goal.  
Research on how goal priming (Moskowitz & Gesundheit, 2009) affects the pursuit of 
personal goals has provided ample evidence on “the capacity of the human mental system to 
adapt flexibly to the environment” (Förster et al., 2009, p. 188). However, whereas goal 
priming serves a self-regulatory function, this does not apply to procedural priming, the role 
of which in the pursuit of personal goals has, so far, not been subject to systematic scientific 
analysis. In the present manuscript we, correspondingly, did not focus on (automatic and 
dynamic) self-regulatory mechanisms within goal systems (i.e., goal priming; cf. Kruglanski 
et al., 2002), but on the question as to what extent the pursuit of goals in everyday life, 
independent of aspects of functionality and semantic content, may be influenced by 
procedural priming effects. More precisely, we explored (in Study 1 at T2) whether cognitive 
procedures, which have been activated in the course of thinking about a particular goal, affect 
the way of processing information in subsequent tasks not related to the initial context. Thus, 
instead of experimentally manipulating cognitive procedures through task instructions (cf. 
Gollwitzer et al., 1990), we analyzed the effect of interindividual differences regarding the 
extent of experienced action crisis on goal-independent thought production. By examining 
indirect procedural priming effects, which are attributable to the mere activation of a personal 
goal, we pursued a methodologically new and thereby theory-building approach. To our 
knowledge, indirect procedural priming effects through the mere activation of personal goals 
have not been theoretically or empirically analyzed. The present results indicate that a 
procedural priming perspective may advance our understanding of the influence of goals on 
human cognition and behavior. 
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From a methodological perspective, the present results provide evidence that “having 
participants complete questionnaires prior to another dependent measure can be a major 
source of ... priming effects” (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, p. 267).   
Whereas the ecological validity of the results is increased by the field character of the 
studies (i.e., the analysis of idiographic goals), inferences about causality, due to the quasi-
experimental or cross-sectional study designs, are not warranted. The present line of research, 
therefore, may be continued and complemented with experimental studies. Whether it is 
possible to experimentally reproduce the far-reaching consequences associated with an action 
crisis (in a personal goal) in a laboratory setting, needs to be evaluated in future research.  
Potentially adverse consequences of procedural priming effects, which are of 
particular interest for the present line of research, have been described by Schooler (2002; 
Schooler et al., 1997). According to processing shift theory (Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al., 
1997), a transfer inappropriate shift occurs if the processing requirements of a subsequent 
task conflict with the primed procedures. Transfer inappropriate shifts, therefore, may 
account for “functional handicap[s]” (H. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987, p. 119), defined by 
the incompatibility of activated cognitive procedures and situational requirements. As 
individuals, in everyday life, constantly switch between different goals (e.g., calling one’s 
spouse from work), it seems therefore highly probable that an action crisis, which may (to 
some extent) transfer to other goals by procedural priming, leads to a functional handicap. 
How an action crisis could result in a functional handicap may be illustrated by the following 
example. One might imagine the situation in which a student, who is seriously questioning 
her/his subject of study, after having attended a class, goes out on a date. Whereas the present 
research aimed at providing an answer to the question if this student, on the way to her/his 
date, is at increased risk of analyzing the pros and cons for meeting the other person (i.e., 
questioning her/his decision to arrange a date), future research may evaluate whether a goal-
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unspecific deliberative mindset, which has been activated by an action crisis experienced 
regarding one’s studies, compromises volitional strategies on how to enchant one’s date. 
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Notes 
1In the terminology of mindset theory of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012; H. 
Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987), the consecutive path of action may be subdivided in four 
functionally distinct action phases, whereby, on a higher level of abstraction, the first (i.e., 
deliberative or predecisional) and the last (i.e., evaluative or postactional) phase are 
conceptualized as motivation and the intermediate (i.e., postdecisional/implemental and 
actional) phases as volition. However, even though both the deliberative and evaluative phase 
are hypothesized to be characterized by a motivational mindset, the two associated tasks (i.e., 
goal setting vs. goal evaluation), with respect to goal pursuit, are functionally different. 
Volitional processes, in contrast, are functionally homogenous as both volitional action 
phases are directed at the translation of goals into action. In the present manuscript, for 
clarity’s sake, we therefore attempted to avoid the term motivational to refer to the 
deliberative mindset.          
2In the present manuscript, for the sake of conceptual clarity, we intentionally avoided 
using the term mindset priming as a subcategory of procedural priming. Mindset priming, in 
scientific literature, has been used to explain psychological phenomena that, in the 
terminology of Förster et al. (2009), would have been classified under semantic and/or goal 
priming.      
3Participants (n =15) who were not studying at the time of measurement were asked to 
list two vocational goals. However, the two subgroups did not significantly differ with 
respect to any study variables. Therefore, for brevity’s sake, we referred exclusively to 
academic goals in the remaining part of the manuscript. 
4Additional explorative analyses did not reveal any significant interaction effects. 
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